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1I
In June 2017, CEU convened a gathering of international experts and 
political figures to examine the state of academic freedom world-wide. 
This volume summarizes the highlights of our discussions. We ranged 
widely, from the closing of universities in Turkey and the narrowing space 
for academic freedom in Hungary, China and Russia, to the controversies 
about free speech roiling American campuses. In this volume, you will 
read thoughtful historical analysis of the origins of the ideal of academic 
freedom; eloquent testimony from the front lines of the battle to defend 
the academy as a free space for controversial thought; as well as analy-
sis of how university autonomy and self-government are endangered by 
hostile political forces around the world. We hope students and faculty, 
university administrators, journalists and politicians in many countries 
will find our CEU discussion a useful guide in understanding the global 
nature of the challenge to academic freedom. 
If there is a single conclusion from this volume it is that academic 
freedom is too important to be left to universities to defend by them-
selves. Universities need to rebuild public confidence in their mission. 
— Michael Ignatieff is President and 
Rector of Central European University
Academic Freedom From Without and Within  
— Michael Ignatieff
2These days higher education is politically isolated: attacked as bastions 
of elite privilege and castigated as the protected domain of arrogant 
experts. Universities cannot afford to let populist political forces turn 
these feelings to their own electoral benefit. Universities need to stand 
up for themselves and take their case to the public. Free universities 
are critical to the survival of democracy itself. Free institutions nourish 
free thought and free thought winnows the kernel of knowledge from 
the chaff of falsehood. Without knowledge, based in patient verification 
and self-questioning, democracies are flying blind. At a time when the 
authority of knowledge in public debate is questioned as never before, 
universities need to stand up for their role as critical custodians of what 
societies, through experimentation and trial and error, actually know. 
Central European University has been defending the principle of academ-
ic freedom and institutional autonomy throughout its twenty-six-year 
history in Budapest. In 2017, our dispute with the Hungarian government 
over whether we could remain in Budapest became a global cause ce-
lebre. More than 500 prominent US and European academics, including 
more than twenty Nobel Laureates, signed an open letter to support CEU. 
Political leaders across Europe have voiced their support and thousands 
marched in the streets of Budapest in defense of CEU and academic 
freedom. 
CEU’s struggle is not over, but the story is worth summarizing briefly be-
cause of the light it sheds on the pressures that academic freedom faces 
even in nominally democratic societies in the 21st century. In March 2017, 
the government passed a law in Parliament changing the regulations gov-
erning foreign educational institutions operating in Hungary. Normally an 
elected government consults with institutions before they initiate import-
ant legal changes. No consultation occurred before the law was tabled in 
Parliament. Normally a law’s application is universal. It should apply to 
3all. This was not the case in Hungary. The law that has come to be known 
as ‘lex CEU’ singled out CEU directly: it forbade us to maintain our dual 
Hungarian and American legal identity and required us to choose either 
a Hungarian or American accreditation; it required us to have a cam-
pus in the United States, when we are among nearly 30 US institutions 
overseas who do not maintain a campus in the US. Lex CEU also required 
our non-European staff to secure work permits, despite the fact that we 
had an exemption from this requirement for many years. Finally, our legal 
status in Hungary was made to depend on a new bilateral agreement 
between Hungary and the state in which we originate. At first the Hun-
garian government insisted that such an agreement should be with the 
United States. The US government pointed out that the US constitution 
leaves jurisdiction in matters of higher education to the states. Eventual-
ly, in order to break the impasse, the Governor of New York State, where 
we are accredited, offered to negotiate a new agreement with Hungary to 
settle CEU’s legal status once and for all. Through the summer of 2017, the 
negotiations made good progress. A text of the agreement was finalized 
in September that would allow CEU to remain in Budapest. CEU agreed 
a further agreement with Bard College to conduct educational activities 
in New York. In October, in a sudden reversal, the Hungarian government 
decided not to sign the New York deal and instead to extend the deadline 
for compliance with the original lex CEU for another year. 
Until January 2019, CEU remains in legal limbo, free to admit new stu-
dents, but uncertain of its legal status in Hungary thereafter. Speculation 
about the government’s motives or its ultimate intentions is pointless. 
What is clear is that the university’s legal situation is a telling illustration 
of the difference between ‘rule by law’ and ‘rule of law’, between arbitrary 
political discretion and lawful certainty. Just as rule of law is essential 
for democracy, so rule of law is critical for any academic freedom worth 
having.
4Even if Hungary were to eventually decide that we are not in compliance 
with lex CEU—CEU’s position is that we are—CEU’s existence is not threat-
ened. The difficulty we have experienced is not an existential crisis. CEU 
has the resources and the reputation to continue its degree programs 
uninterrupted whatever happens next. Other universities around the 
world, harassed by their governments or by hostile political forces, may 
not be so lucky. At CEU itself, life goes on. Our classes are full, our faculty 
continues their research, and we are in the middle of a strategic planning 
process that will set the course for the university’s development through 
the year 2022. 
II
CEU’s experience may be unique in the history of European higher edu-
cation in recent times, but in a wider context, it is not exceptional. Many 
other universities around the world face much more serious threats 
to their institutional and legal autonomy. In Turkey, public universities 
have been closed; faculties have been dismissed en masse; the purge of 
students continues more than a year after the Turkish coup and count-
er-coup. In St. Petersburg, the European University of St. Petersburg strug-
gles to stay alive in the face of recurrent official challenges to its legal 
status. In China, the Communist Party has re-imposed ideological disci-
pline on universities and colleges, after a brief period of liberalization, 
and the space for free thought and free expression has narrowed. Foreign 
universities operating in China have had to adjust to new restrictions that 
limit free collaboration with other Chinese institutions. 
In defending academic freedom against these threats, international 
universities, who have pioneered the globalization of higher education, 
need to develop shared rules about how to work in authoritarian and 
semi-authoritarian contexts and to stand up for each other when these 
5rules are broken. Certainly, CEU benefited enormously from the support 
we received from the international academic community. 
At the same time as authoritarian and semi-authoritarian governments 
are restricting or abolishing academic freedom, there are threats to aca-
demic freedom in well-established democracies as well.
Freedom is being undermined by forces outside the academy, but also by 
partisan political passions within. Political space is polarizing everywhere, 
and universities themselves are no exception. Some professors and 
students appear to believe that academic freedom is valuable only to the 
extent that it enables them to promote one set of political opinions while 
banishing others. In the United States, at Middlebury College a crowd 
shouted down a conservative author and left a professor who came to his 
aid with a concussion; in Oregon, a professor was harassed for refusing 
to join a protest against racism. In Berlin and in Dresden, professors 
have been bullied for conservative views or for attempting to explain the 
appeal of the extreme far right. A university that becomes a safe haven 
only for liberal or progressive views is betraying the cause of academic 
freedom itself.
This is one reason why universities have forfeited some public support 
and why coded attacks on ‘political correctness’ on campus have secured 
a wide hearing at least in the United States.  
Far away from university seminar rooms, research labs and libraries, 
many people have been persuaded, by politicians and media alike, to 
regard academic freedom as the questionable privilege of a tenured 
elite. In publicly funded universities, professors’ salaries are paid for by 
citizens who may have never had the chance at a post-secondary edu-
6cation. Resentment at the privileges of academic life, such as they are, is 
widespread. 
What can be done to strengthen public support for academic freedom? 
The answer may lie in rebalancing the relation between academic free-
dom and social responsibility. Scholars, researchers and teachers need 
freedom to think and learn, but in return they need to communicate 
their research to their fellow citizens and, wherever possible, make their 
teaching and learning useful to the societies they serve. Universities need 
to do everything they can to remove barriers—economic, cultural and 
CEU students and staff saying thank you to all supporters
7psychological—that deny fellow citizens the chance to secure a college 
or university education. The privileges of academic freedom come with 
responsibilities to our societies and communities which we need to dis-
charge as best we can.
In order to strengthen public support for academic freedom, we also 
need to get out the message that our freedom protects theirs. At the 
moment, this message is not being heard. If you ask people on the street 
what academic freedom means, some will say it means professors have 
a job for life. In a world of pervasive economic insecurity, the privileges 
8of the tenured few look hard to justify. We need to remind the public that 
tenure protects them too, by defending the right to pursue unpopular re-
search and take unpopular positions. It is one of the counter-majoritarian 
bulwarks of a free society, like a free press or an independent judiciary. 
Academic freedom is also commonly attacked as a license for arrogant 
academic expertise. The popular dislike of ‘expertise’ has been exploited 
by populist politicians who pit ‘the people’, against a credentialed minori-
ty. University leaders need to say clearly that our societies would descend 
into blind chaos without academic knowledge, without evidence-based 
public policy and the rigorous testing, by universities, of political ideas 
and their implementation. 
The deeper problem is an erosion of the connection between academ-
ic freedom and the freedom of all citizens. The number of our fellow 
citizens who will say “academic freedom is my freedom too” are in 
a  minority. 
Universities need to make the case that democracy includes the right of 
institutions, not just universities, to govern themselves free of outside 
interference. Unless institutions can defend their right to govern them-
selves against outside forces—and this may include both governments 
and pressures from corporate interests and donors—they cannot effec-
tively defend the rights of their members within and they cannot speak 
up for citizens outside their walls. 
A strong democracy requires institutions sufficiently independent to 
counter-balance majority rule, to defend minority opinions and minority 
rights. Universities belong with the courts, the media, professional associ-
ations and civil society organizations as critical defenders of a democracy 
robust enough to resist the drift to tyranny.
9When democracies are weak, when rule of law, checks and balances, 
freedom of the press and an independent judiciary are eroded, universi-
ties become vulnerable. Universities have a visceral interest in doing what 
they can, with their teaching and research, to strengthen respect for the 
democratic institutions on which their own freedom depends. 
Democracy is, above all, the noble ideal of free communities choos-
ing their aims for themselves, giving themselves rules by consent, and 
discharging obligations of protection and care to their members. Where 
did this ideal first take root in Europe? In the community of scholars, in 
the medieval universities of Bologna, Salamanca, Oxford, Cambridge, the 
Sorbonne, Heidelberg, and the great early modern universities of east-
ern Europe, the Charles University in Prague, Jagiellonian in Cracow, or 
Eötvös Loránd in Budapest: all founded centuries ago, all still governing 
themselves, all the kernel of an ideal of self-rule that is the very core of 
the democratic faith. Academic freedom, therefore, is one of democracy’s 
ancestors and today it has become one of its vital conditions.

11
Academic freedom is highly specific to institutions of scholarly research 
and teaching; it is not, like liberty or equality, a universal human right. It 
is not a general right of free speech, although the two are often confused. 
Instead, academic freedom applies to those of us who are associated 
with universities. It refers both to the internal functions of the univer-
sity—to the research and teaching that go on here—and to the external 
relations of the university with the nation-state. 
It is the question of the relationship between the university and the state 
that I want to address today. The relationship is not a simple one; it is 
traversed by tensions that are necessary and unresolvable. I will look at 
two of these tensions. The first is between the search for truth and the 
demands of power, what might be called a tension between raison and 
raison d’état. The second tension is between the hierarchical structure of 
the academy and the principles and practices of political democracies. 
I will argue that academic freedom mediates both of these tensions.
— Joan Wallach Scott is profes-
sor emerita in the School of Social 
Science at the Institute for Advanced 
Study in Princeton, New Jersey. She 
is a long-standing member of the 
Committee on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure of the American Association 
of University Professors (AAUP).
Academic Freedom: The Tension Between the 
University and the State — Joan Wallach Scott
12
The University and the Nation
The origin of the modern university has everything to do with na-
tion-building. An older history is that of the religious sponsorship of uni-
versities, with the various relations between churches and states affecting 
their governance. Medieval universities were established to train priests, 
lawyers, doctors and schoolmasters, not always with state sanction. It was 
Wilhelm von Humboldt who provided the model for the modern universi-
ty at the University of Berlin early in the 19th century. One scholar has de-
scribed its function this way: the Humboldtian university, he writes, “[is] 
the institution charged with watching over the spiritual life of the people 
of the rational state, reconciling ethnic tradition and statist rationality.”1 
In Humboldt’s vision, shared by many of his German Idealist colleagues, 
the university’s mission was to produce students committed to discovery 
and to inculcate the common language, history, literature, and geogra-
phy that made possible the creation of a shared national culture. This 
unifying culture served not only a domestic function, but became an 
important arm of international competition and imperial expansion. From 
the late 18th century on, there has been a tension between two avowed 
purposes of the university: to educate the citizens of the nation-state 
and, equally importantly, to encourage the critical thinking that would 
correct abuses of power and furnish the nation with the creativity and 
change that were vital to national well-being. Unfettered rational inquiry 
was taken to be the best guarantee of a healthy national future. This was 
Emmanuel Kant’s argument in “The Conflict of the Faculties.”2 There Kant 
insisted that the faculty of philosophy (the so-called lower faculty) was 
the most vital arm of the university because its job was to interrogate the 
very foundations of the higher faculties of theology, medicine, and law. 
Philosophy’s interrogation was a correction not only to stale disciplinary 
orthodoxy, but also to the dangers of unfettered state power and its 
1 Bill Readings, The University in Ruins (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 15.
2 The Conflict of the Faculties (Der Streit Der Fakultäten), ed. Mary J Gregor (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1979).
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influence on those more practical disciplines. Kant’s essay captures the 
dilemma that faced the modern university: how to reconcile reason and 
the state, the search for truth and the requirements of power.3 The liter-
ary scholar Masao Miyoshi described this dilemma as a tension between 
“utilitarian nationalism” (whose aim is to secure the national good) 
and “anti-utilitarian inquiry” (which depends on free and spontaneous 
expression). “The university as an institution has served Caesar and Mam-
mon,” he wrote, “all the while manifesting its fealty to Minerva, Clio, and 
the Muses.”4 
This tension at the heart of the university’s mission has been apparent 
throughout its history, although changes in demography and curricu-
lum in the nations of the West have sometimes made it less apparent. 
Neo-liberal transformations have certainly taken attention away from 
both national agendas and critical thinking: students are now more likely 
to be treated as paying clients, whose human capital can be enhanced by 
a university education and whose vocational interests should dictate the 
curriculum. The research and development needs of private companies 
more often drive the inquiries of professors (especially in the sciences), 
and globalization—not national interest—is at the heart of what some 
have termed “the information and knowledge industry.”5 Still, I would 
argue that the Humboldt model has not entirely disappeared; its tensions 
remain as a legacy to be drawn on.
Those tensions have been clearly evident in the post-colonial era, as 
new nations emerged to claim identities either denied or suppressed 
by imperial rule. Edward Said wrote compellingly of this process in 
a 1996 article on “Identity, Authority, and Freedom.” There he pointed 
3 M. Miyoshi, “Ivory Tower in Escrow,” Boundary 2 27, no. 1 (March 1, 2000): 58, 
doi:10.1215/01903659-27-1-7.
4 Ibid., 13.
5 Ibid.
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out, referring to developments in the Middle East, that “Arab universities 
are not only nationalist universities, but are also political institutions 
for perfectly understandable reasons.”6 Understandable because “all 
societies accord a remarkable privilege to the university and school as 
crucibles for shaping national identity.” Once national independence had 
freed these nations from the yokes of Ottoman or European imperialism, 
he noted, an opportunity opened to educate young people—to develop 
their pride—in the traditions, languages, history, and culture of their own 
countries. (The same might be said of the nations of Eastern and Central 
Europe after the end of Soviet rule in 1989.) But a terrible problem soon 
arose, Said noted, when national universities were “reconceived as 
extensions of the newly established national security state.” As a re-
sult, the real value of education was short-circuited by the ruling party 
which sought “political conformity rather than intellectual excellence.” 
“Nationalism in the university has come to represent not freedom but 
accommodation, not brilliance and daring but caution and fear, not the 
advancement of knowledge but self-preservation.”7 “Political repression,” 
he went on, “has never been good for academic freedom, and, perhaps, 
more importantly, it has been disastrous for academic and intellectual 
excellence.”8 The two—academic freedom and intellectual excellence—
are, of course, entirely interdependent.
Without wanting to deny the importance of education for the construc-
tion of national identity, Said asked: “which national identity?” and how 
might it be understood in relation to academic freedom? His answer—
which I will quote at length because I cannot match its clarity and 
eloquence—acknowledges the needs of the nation, but makes critical 
intellectual work its own raison d’être. “My assessment of Arab academ-
6 Edward W. Said, “Identity, Authority and Freedom: The Potentate and the Traveler,” 
in The Future of Academic Freedom, ed. Louis Menand (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), 218. 
7 Ibid., 219.
8 Ibid., 220.
15
ic life is that too high a price has been paid in sustaining nationalist 
regimes that have allowed political passions and an ideology of confor-
mity to dominate—perhaps even to swallow up—civil institutions such as 
the university. To make the practice of intellectual discourse dependent 
on conformity to a predetermined political ideology is to nullify intellect 
altogether.”9 For Said, intellectual discourse is above all, “the freedom to 
be critical: criticism is intellectual life and, while the academic precinct 
contains a great deal in it, its spirit is intellectual and critical, and neither 
reverential nor patriotic (…)” It is the freedom to critique the terms of an 
exclusionary national identity that is vital both to the university and the 
nation, “Otherwise, I fear, the old inequities, cruelties, and unthinking at-
tachments that have so disfigured human history will be recycled by the 
academy, which then loses much of its real intellectual freedom as a re-
sult.”10 Here, in a somewhat different language, is Kant’s idea that critical 
philosophy provides the ultimate corrective to abuses of state power.11 
Said’s notion of national identity was one that disclaimed the triumph of 
one people over another and the insistence on homogeneity as the bottom 
line of a common culture. Instead, it is the recognition—enabled by critical 
thinkers in the humanities and social sciences especially—of its relation to 
other national identities, and, within the nation, to the multiple identities 
we inhabit, to the differences that bind us, to a commonality of shared 
differences rather than to a genetic or historical sameness. Even more 
important was the lesson “that human life and history are secular—that 
is actually constructed and reproduced by men and women.”12 This means 
that there is nothing fixed about our social and political arrangements, 
that they are open to criticism and to change. It is precisely the specter of 
change, of course, that threatens the rulers of the authoritarian state.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., 223.
11 Ibid., 220.
12 Ibid., 223.
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Said argued that the function of academic freedom was to protect and 
preserve the critical spirit, ensuring the pursuit of justice and truth wher-
ever it might lead. “Rather than viewing the search for knowledge in the 
academy as the search for coercion and control over others, we should 
regard knowledge as something for which to risk identity, and we should 
think of academic freedom as an invitation to give up on identity in the 
hope of understanding and perhaps even assuming more than one.”13 
Academic Freedom
“Our model for academic freedom,” Said wrote, “should be the migrant 
or traveler,” voyaging beyond familiar places, confronting the unknown.14 
For him, academic freedom is a kind of passport for international travel—
guaranteeing the right of scholars to go wherever the search for truth 
may lead. It was one way of addressing the tension at the heart of the 
mission of the modern university—that between utilitarian nationalism 
and non-utilitarian inquiry, between reason of state and reason itself. 
In the United States, the concept of academic freedom was formulated 
by a group of professors at the turn of the last century, precisely as a way 
of mediating that tension, of providing a rationale for an autonomous 
faculty, not as a peculiar elitist privilege, but as a guarantee of advancing 
“the common good.” In 1915, the newly organized American Association of 
University Professors (AAUP), among them the American pragmatist John 
Dewey, articulated a vision of the university that was at once immune to 
powerful interests (in the US these were both state legislators and private 
benefactors—Caesar and Mammon), and that promised to serve them, 
however indirectly, by producing new knowledge for the common good. 
Their version of academic freedom rested on the notion that knowledge 
and power were separable: the pursuit of truth ought to have nothing to 
do with public conflicts of interest, even if new knowledge could weigh 
13 Ibid., 227.
14 Ibid.
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in on one side or another of those conflicts. The university was defined 
as “an inviolable refuge from [the] tyranny [of public opinion] (…) an 
intellectual experiment station, where new ideas may germinate and 
where their fruit, though distasteful to the community as a whole, may 
be allowed to ripen.“15 As that last reference to “distasteful” reactions in-
dicates, academic freedom was designed to protect the most critical, the 
most unorthodox of university faculty. A professor ought to be “a conta-
gious center of intellectual enthusiasm,” wrote one university president. 
“It is better for students to think about heresies than not to think at all; 
better for them to climb new trails and stumble over error if need be, 
than to ride forever in upholstered ease on the overcrowded highway.”16
The best statement I have seen of the principle of academic freedom 
comes from the regents of the University of Wisconsin in 1894, repudiat-
ing efforts by state legislators to fire a professor because his teaching did 
not conform to their economic views. 
As Regents of a university with over a hundred instructors 
supported by nearly two millions of people who hold a vast 
diversity of views regarding the great questions which at 
present agitate the human mind, we could not for a mo-
ment think of recommending the dismissal or even the 
criticism of a teacher even if some of his opinions should, 
in some quarters, be regarded as visionary. Such a course 
would be equivalent to saying that no professor should 
teach anything which is not accepted by everybody as true. 
This would cut our curriculum down to very small propor-
tions. We cannot for a moment believe that knowledge has 
reached its final goal, or that the present condition of soci-
ety is perfect. We must therefore welcome from our teachers 
15 AAUP, “Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure,” 1915, 32.
16 Ibid., 36.
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such discussions as shall suggest the means and prepare 
the way by which knowledge may be extended, present evils 
be removed and others prevented. We feel that we would 
be unworthy of the position we hold if we did not believe in 
progress in all departments of knowledge. In all lines of ac-
ademic investigation it is of the utmost importance that the 
investigator should be absolutely free to follow the indica-
tions of truth wherever they may lead. Whatever may be the 
limitations which trammel inquiry elsewhere we believe the 
great state University of Wisconsin should ever encourage 
that continual and fearless sifting and winnowing by which 
alone the truth can be found. 
1894 Ely trial committee final report17 
The autonomy of professors, defended in this statement, rested on the 
fact that the faculty was a self-regulating body, trained and credentialed 
according to the rules of their discipline and profession. They were, 
in the words of the philosopher John Dewey, “an organized society of 
truth-seekers” uniquely qualified to judge one another’s abilities. These 
organized societies were the national professional associations that 
trained and certified competence, a form of expertise we depend on 
for the advancement of knowledge in all fields. The legal scholar Rob-
ert Post puts it this way: “Disciplines are grounded on the premise that 
some ideas are better than others; disciplinary communities claim the 
prerogative to discriminate between competent and incompetent work.”18 
University administrators (those charged with the efficient running of the 
institution and its legal and financial operations) and trustees (who gov-
ern with ultimate authority) are not in a position to question the exper-
17 See: Theodore Herfurth, “Sifting and Winnowing: a Chapter in the History of Aca-
demic Freedom at the University of Wisconsin,” 1949, 11.
18 Robert Post, The Classic First Amendment Tradition Under Stress: Freedom of 
Speech and the University ([unpublished], 2017), 16.
19
tise of the faculty in matters of research and teaching; instead they share 
governance with the faculty, each carrying responsibility for separate 
activities, together ensuring the viability of the institution. The guarantee 
of academic freedom is at the heart of their relationship.
I was reminded as I wrote this of an experience I had here at CEU, more 
than 15 years ago, during the tumultuous reign of the Rector Yehuda El-
kana. At one meeting that I attended, he confronted faculty and students 
who were protesting the planned reform or elimination of programs in 
gender studies and environmental studies. There he justified his right to 
decide unilaterally, with a phrase that was endlessly ridiculed by those 
who considered him something of a tyrant. “A university is not a democ-
racy,” he said. In a way, of course, he was right. But not exactly. Typically, 
a university is not a democracy in the sense that not everyone gets to 
vote about what is taught and how (although there are exceptions, I’m 
told, for example in the Cambridge colleges in the UK)—but more typically, 
it is a hierarchically organized cooperative society, perhaps better to say 
a federation, of experts with different competencies, who share responsi-
bility for its critical social mission. Trustees usually have the final say and 
administrators recommend action about faculty and students to them. 
But a certain division of labor is also the norm. Ideally, each group should 
respect the others’ competencies in their processes of decision-making. 
Of course, the dangers of trustee or administrative overreach are some-
times as troubling as interference from politicians and financial patrons, 
but so are calls from the Right (we are hearing lots of this in the US these 
days) for students’ right of free speech to determine what is taught, and 
for “substantive neutrality” or balanced interpretations in the classroom. 
Post’s reply to this movement seems right to me: “Disciplines do not cre-
ate expert knowledge through a market place of ideas in which content 
discrimination is prohibited and all ideas are deemed equal.”19 Although 
19 Ibid., 17.
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there are often conflicts within disciplines about what counts as accept-
able work—critical new ideas are not always granted validity and there 
have been long struggles by scholars (feminists, poststructuralists, critical 
race theorists, queer theorists) to achieve legitimacy for their fields of 
study—still it is academic freedom and not student free speech that 
informs these struggles. 
If academic freedom is the prerogative of a specialized group of pro-
fessional intellectuals, and if the university in which they work is not 
technically a democracy, on what basis can the university claim its rights? 
Why is it that academic freedom has been the cry of university presidents 
and faculty facing unprecedented attacks by authoritarian politicians in 
Turkey, Poland, Hungary and lately, in the United States? 
It may be paradoxical to argue that democracy depends on the universi-
ty even if the university is not itself a perfect democracy. But that is the 
case. It is the case because critical thinking—Kant’s notion of reason in 
the face of power, or Dewey’s idea that innovation depended on challeng-
ing “deep-rooted prejudice,” or Said’s insistence that “freedom cannot 
simply be reduced to venerating the unexamined authority of a national 
identity and its culture”—critical thinking is the life-blood of democrat-
ic societies; without it all visions of justice and hope are lost.”20 Critical 
thinking depends on informed and disciplined knowledge, on our ability 
to search for, and to teach our students how to search for truth. That kind 
of teaching is not a democratic process; it cannot be one. And yet democ-
racy depends on it. (Real democracy, I should add. “Illiberal democracy” is 
an oxymoron.)
When the state finds itself at odds with critical thinking, we know that 
the search for truth has been shut down; when populist orators decry the 
20 Said, “Identity, Authority and Freedom: The Potentate and the Traveler,” 223.
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elitism of the academic establishment, we know that knowledge pro-
duction is being directed to nefarious ends; when what Said called the 
“secular” dimension of critique (its refusal of transcendent explanations 
for human life, whether based on history, god, or nature) is replaced by 
invocations of essentialism, the borders of knowledge are being closed 
and the search for truth, in whatever realm, is canceled. The denial of ac-
ademic freedom to its universities, of permission to pursue truth wherev-
er it leads, signals the ultimate failure of democracy. And it does not bode 
well for the future prosperity and health of the nation.
Public and Private
One of the ironies of the current relationship between universities and 
nations is that the most endangered institutions are the ones once con-
sidered the most democratic—the public universities supported by the 
state. Those universities which are open to students at minimal tuition 
costs, depend on the state for financial support but also, legally, the state 
has ultimate authority to determine their future. Indeed, it is often in the 
name of protecting the public’s financial interest that politicians justify 
their intervention in curricular and faculty domains. It is those universi-
ties which most easily succumb to the demand that (as Said put it) “ intel-
lectual discourse must worship at the altar of national identity,”21 and so 
succumb to the suppression of critical inquiry that is the inevitable result. 
The resurgence of strong nationalist tendencies is evident across the 
world, at least in part, as a reaction to the rise of globalization and its 
undermining of the frontiers of national sovereignty. The reassertion of 
the importance of the nation is, arguably, the populist response to the 
crisis of neo-liberal capitalism. This has brought with it the test of patri-
otism for all manner of intellectual work—a patriotism that is antithetical 
to free thought and the academic freedom that protects it. In the US, we 
21 Ibid., 222.
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have the example of the Secretary of Education, Betsy DeVos, warning 
university students that “the fight against the education establishment 
extends to you too. The faculty, from adjunct professor to deans, tell you 
what to do, what to say, and more ominously what to think.” For DeVos the 
job of educators to teach students how to think is beside the point. Her 
notion of freedom of thought is the expression of opinion, unconstrained 
by the requirements of truth or rigor. The real problem for her, as for 
those seeking to consolidate their power at all costs, is that critique will 
expose the abuses that necessarily accompany authoritarian rule. 
In the modern period, new private universities have grown alongside 
public ones, often to represent special interests that weren’t being served 
adequately in the public realm. The numbers of the new private universi-
ties vary widely from country to country, as does their relationship to the 
state. Usually there is some kind of contractual agreement that recog-
nizes their legitimacy as degree-granting institutions, but they tend to 
have greater independence than their public counterparts. In the US, as 
elsewhere, many private universities were originally founded by religious 
groups, but that was not exclusively the case. And even those that were 
originally religious have become increasingly secular, as is the case with 
the American universities in Cairo and Beirut or with Boğaziçi Universi-
ty in Istanbul.22 Some private universities were established to provide 
a more elite environment for students of the upper classes, or for those 
with financial means but who were ineligible for admission to public 
schools. Although private universities typically require state certification, 
they are less susceptible to direct intervention than are state-support-
ed institutions whose financial interest gives the state greater power to 
intervene. 
22 Bogaziçi is now fully administered by the state, but with a special status in relation 
to other state universities linked to its private origins.
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That is why private institutions have been able to preserve something of 
the critical spirit in the face of all-out assaults on higher education by 
those seeking to consolidate nationalist identities and to eliminate not 
just opposition, but the kind of thinking that would call rulers to account 
for the violations of principle and justice they undertake. Of course, 
private universities are subject to pressures from donors and politicians—
they are not immune from attempts to rein in critique and to control 
what is studied. Nor are they free of the neo-liberal processes that are 
everywhere undermining the substance and ethos of a classical univer-
sity education. But, still, they occupy a privileged place in the realm of 
academe and that privilege has made them, in our time, the custodians 
of academic freedom in the sense I have been talking about it—as the 
protection of the search for truth wherever it leads, of the spirit of critical 
inquiry that, at its best, refuses compromise. 
If, in the US, the University of Wisconsin is no longer a place that allows 
for the “continual and fearless sifting and winnowing by which alone 
the truth can be found,” private institutions remain in a better position 
to promote that legacy. It is on their campuses that it is still possible to 
teach freely and to resist interference—the call for academic freedom 
resonates with the values and principles to which they at least nominally 
aspire.
I think that is the case for CEU here in Hungary. It has long been able 
to stand apart from the currents and passions of successive political 
regimes. It has also long been a training ground for the leadership of 
movements for social justice, the rule of law, and the creation of open 
societies in the region. On the one hand, one might ask how a small grad-
uate institution could pose a serious threat to a government with vast 
military and police resources at its disposal. On the other hand, the fact 
of the attack signals the danger that the quest for truth by critical think-
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ers is seen to pose to authoritarian rule. The frightening aspect of this is 
that power is on the side of the state. Indeed, the resolution of the crisis 
might well come from a negotiation between two sovereign entities—the 
state of NY and the nation of Hungary!
But there is also a hopeful side to the story. It suggests that despite the 
lamentations of scholars about the end of the university as we knew it—
about what Bill Readings called “the university in ruins”23 and Chris New-
field deemed “the unmaking”24 of the university—there is something that 
persists against great odds. The process of erosion of the academy has 
been gradual and incomplete, allowing the legacy of Kant and Humboldt 
to survive, even as its homogenizing cultural function has disappeared. 
There are pockets of resistance on campuses which honor the principles 
and practices of truth seeking. We can see this in the calls for academ-
ic freedom that echo across the globe, in the thousands of protestors 
who filled the streets of Budapest, and who also continue to speak out 
in Turkey, Poland, and the US. We can see it in the international outcry 
against intellectual repression that refuses to accept defeat. And, perhaps 
ironically, we can see it, too, in the determination of authoritarian rulers 
to banish critical thought and the institutions that foster it. Their deter-
mination is a measure of the aspirational power of the idea of academic 
freedom, but it is only aspirational. To get rulers to value and respect it 
requires a political struggle, the dimensions of which are extremely large. 
What is the nature of that political struggle? Does it undermine the plu-
ralism and diversity of views that are the proud values of the search for 
truth and the production of knowledge? I don’t think so. The protection 
of critical thinking has always involved a confrontation with power. By 
its very nature it is political. The political struggle I am referring to is not 
23 Readings, The University in Ruins.
24 Christopher Newfield, Unmaking the Public University: The Forty Year Assault on the 
Middle Class (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).
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partisan or ideological, rather it commits us to the continued practice of 
critical thinking; the principle that guides us, that articulates the meaning 
of our struggle is academic freedom. Critical thinking, in this definition of 
it, is both the cause and effect of academic freedom. 
I leave you, then with a circular argument: we need academic freedom 
to protect the necessarily non-partisan, but nonetheless political work 
of critical thinking, even as we must engage in that political/intellectual 
work to bring academic freedom to life. But the politics of the moment 
requires more than critical thinking, it requires rallying support for the 
only guarantee we have that democracy can be saved or restored. I hope 
this conference will give us the means to think and act on that require-
ment: to recognize the importance (to say nothing of the pleasure) of our 
intellectual work and to find the practical political means to continue to 
do it. It is the challenge we urgently face, and one we have no choice but 
to meet.

THE THREAT WITHOUT:  
STATE PRACTICES AND BARRIERS TO 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AROUND THE 
WORLD
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In order to design and put in practice policies or other actions that are 
supportive of academic freedom, it is imperative to understand the rela-
tionship between academic freedom and the state. I cannot address this 
matter here in its entirety but I would like to put forward three ideas that 
shed light on this relationship, which is “traversed by tensions that are 
necessary and unresolvable,” to use a phrase from Joan Scott’s chapter.
The Distinction Between Academic Freedom and University 
Autonomy
When we try to understand the relationship between academic freedom 
and the state, it is helpful to make use of the distinction between aca-
demic freedom and university autonomy (or institutional autonomy). This 
distinction is a contested one. Still, it is helpful. Traditionally, academic 
freedom is understood as the freedom of individual academics and 
students to teach, study and pursue knowledge and research without un-
reasonable interference or restriction from law, institutional regulations 
or public pressure. This resonates with Einstein’s often-quoted definition:
— Liviu Matei is Provost and Pro-
Rector of Central European University 
and a Professor of Higher Education 
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University autonomy, on the other hand, is of the institution, not the indi-
vidual. It is about the right of the university to determine its organization 
and administrative structures, to decide on priorities, manage its budget, 
hire personnel and admit students, decide on the content and form of its 
teaching and research. Very often, when we talk about infringement on 
academic freedom as interference by the state, we are in reality referring 
to the restriction of institutional autonomy and not of academic freedom. 
Academic freedom and institutional autonomy are related, but different. 
We may say, in fact, that institutional autonomy is a precondition for 
academic freedom. 
To illustrate this, let us take the case of CEU. We can clearly interpret the 
recent attacks against CEU in Hungary as being directed against univer-
sity autonomy. The attack of the Hungarian government was not directly 
against our faculty members or students, against their freedom to pursue 
the study of a particular subject or publish a paper on a given topic. 
This was not about censorship of academic work. Rather, it was an attack 
against our University as an institution, about the right of this institution 
to decide on how to organize its work, its administrative operations and 
governance structures. 
By academic freedom I understand the right to search 
for truth and to publish and teach what one holds to be 
true.
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Matters of academic freedom are more salient in certain countries; in 
others, it is rather institutional autonomy that is more critical. In the US 
and Western Europe, institutional autonomy is often taken for granted 
and what is more debated is academic freedom. In other countries, as in 
many parts of the post-Soviet region, institutional autonomy is severely 
restricted, which makes it a more urgent matter to discuss and attend to. 
Let me mention Myanmar as an example. This country is an emerging 
democracy where CEU’s Elkana Center for Higher Education has been 
working intensely for the last five years. There is still almost no institu-
tional autonomy in the country after decades of repressive political 
regimes, which makes the matter of academic freedom basically irrele-
vant. All rectors, academics and many administrators are rotated; they are 
moved from one university to another around the country. The individuals 
and institutions concerned have no say on who is going where and when. 
There is no staffing autonomy. Curricula are decided centrally for all 
disciplines by the Ministry. Universities have no ownership over their 
buildings, cannot decide on student enrollments or finances. As a conse-
quence, because there is almost no institutional autonomy, the organiza-
tion of the universities is completely ineffective and there is no genuine 
research and teaching in the country—there is nothing to be censured, 
really, as there is no possibility of choosing. For this reason, as the higher 
education system of the country is beginning to reform, there is no 
discussion about academic freedom (although academic freedom is 
nominally recognized by law). The big discussion in Myanmar higher 
education nowadays is about autonomy as a precondition for genuine 
university work. It is the state that makes the work of universities impos-
sible, having deprived them of autonomy over many decades. It is also 
the state that is trying to change this situation, and for the better. CEU 
has been working in Myanmar with national authorities and the two 
32
flagship universities since 2012 to reform system-level regulations and 
make autonomy possible. 
Academic Freedom and Institutional Autonomy are 
Multidimensional
Academic freedom and institutional autonomy are not binary, yes-or-no 
variables. They are not unidimensional either. Both are multidimensional 
and are a matter of degree. There is no absolute freedom anywhere. And, 
importantly, there is at least some freedom in any university at any time. 
By this, I do not mean to ignore or excuse the reality of severe restrictions 
and repression of academic freedom and university autonomy in certain 
countries, going all the way from censorship to imprisonment and even 
killings of academics and students. Still, speaking of academic freedom, 
it is important to recognize that in different systems and institutions ac-
ademics have more freedom or less freedom, as opposed to no freedom 
at all or complete freedom. They can be free in certain areas but not in 
others. On the other side, speaking of institutional autonomy, universities 
in particular national systems may have the right to decide on their own 
in certain areas but not in others. They can have more freedom in one 
area and very limited freedom in another. We cannot speak of autonomy 
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University, Myanmar
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as one discreet variable that can be reflected in a single index or mea-
sure, but rather as a combination or configuration of dimensions and 
degrees. This combination should be taken into account to understand 
properly the university autonomy as a concept and also as a defined 
condition of a given university or higher education system at a particular 
time. This blend is fundamentally a result of policies for which the state 
is ultimately responsible, although other actors might be involved as well. 
The exact nature of the mix of degrees and dimensions is obviously not 
without consequences for the work of the university. 
Take China for example. Chinese universities have large financial and 
significant academic autonomy. However, this is not the full picture. What 
they lack, according to scholars of Chinese higher education,1 is the right 
to decide on their long-term priorities and strategic orientation. They 
lack the so-called “strategic autonomy.” While universities can decide 
by themselves in particular areas, the overall institutional direction is 
decided by state authorities from the outside. It is, in a way, as if Chinese 
universities were given by the government powerful cars to drive and 
a lot of money to buy gas, but they are also given a map by the same 
government with one single highway they can use, and are not allowed to 
explore other avenues than what is on the map. And after a while they get 
another map, with another road. This approach to university autonomy 
helps to understand the often studied (and deplored) lack of creativity in 
China (or “why China can’t innovate,” as formulated by Abrami, Kirby, and 
McFarlan2). It also helps explain that although China has overtaken the US 
in terms of numbers of academic publications, it lags behind in produc-
ing genuine new knowledge that shows creativity. 
1 See for example: Qiang Zha and Ruth Hayhoe, “The ‘Beijing Consensus’ and the 
Chinese Model of University Autonomy” 9, no. 1 (2014): 42–62.
2 Regina. M. Abrami, William C. Kirby, and F. Warren McFarlan, “Why China Can’t Inno-
vate,” Harvard Business Review, no. March 2014 (2014).
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If academic freedom and institutional autonomy are not binary variables, 
not yes or no, does this also mean that they cannot be fully repressed? 
This is an interesting question. Let us take the case of Russia, a hot spot 
on the global map in the fight for academic freedom and autonomy. In 
her research, Liza Potapova, a doctoral student and Elkana fellow at CEU, 
notes that the Russian state in our times has different approaches to 
different types of freedom. Academic freedom is tolerated, within limits 
that are at times quite broad, while freedom of association and freedom 
of speech are severely restricted, to the point on annihilation. Why does 
the government tolerate, in fact even encourage, academic freedom, 
albeit within certain limits? The answer in this case is that the Russian 
government expects something (“returns”) from universities: to produce 
knowledge that is good for economic development, for social mobility 
and for symbolic reasons (international prestige for the country). The 
Russian government has the ambition to place five universities in the first 
100 of the world by 2020 (the Russian “academic excellence project,” also 
known as “5-100”). It is understood—and accepted—that universities can-
not deliver all the state expects from them without autonomy. Therefore, 
Russian universities and academics are allowed to exercise freedom with-
in certain limits. As soon as they confront or challenge the government, 
or are perceived as such, they overstep the limits and will be repressed. 
The political factor, the will of the state or powerful politicians, remain 
important and may play both ways, in support of autonomy or against 
it. We have seen a “differentiated treatment” of universities in a single 
city, St. Petersburg. Colleagues at the Higher School of Economics, whose 
university is flourishing, publish wonderful research and have a robust 
educational program. They have been careful not only to build a strong 
academic basis for the institution, but also to avoid going on a collision 
course with the government. At the same time, the more independent 
European University, another good academic institution in the same city, 
is facing the risk of being closed down. More than just “differentiated,” 
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this case illustrates a somewhat discretionary treatment of universities, 
academic freedom and autonomy, which might be common characteris-
tic of illiberal regimes. Still, academic freedom does exist in Russia, as it 
exists in other regimes that can be considered authoritarian. 
Another example is the higher education miracle of Singapore. Good 
universities have been created top-down in Singapore with a lot of finan-
cial support from the government but with little, almost no institutional 
autonomy at the beginning in some key areas. That has changed because 
the government expected to achieve certain broader objectives (uni-
versities to fulfill precise “goals” defined by the government) and these 
universities could not deliver without autonomy. Now, basically all great 
Singaporean universities describe themselves as autonomous. 
These examples speak to the degree to which the state can tolerate, even 
encourage and support academic freedom and institutional autonomy in 
non-democratic regimes. 
We can also go back to the question whether academic freedom can be 
completely suppressed. We can discuss for a moment the example of 
science in Soviet universities during the Stalin era. There was a lot of 
excellent scientific production on the backdrop of complete absence of 
democracy. Did academics produce outstanding research only in disci-
plines that were programmatically encouraged by the government for 
specific political reasons (arms race, for example) or also in disciplines 
that it simply neglected? Did they produce good research because in 
reality they had some degree of academic freedom, even in a severely 
authoritarian regime? Is this something we can conceptualize simply in 
terms of “freedom of thinking”? These are some of the key questions we 
need to ask in order to understand the relationship between academic 
freedom, university autonomy, and the state.
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Universities Need the State
Universities need a state around them. They cannot operate well without 
state institutions and regulations to protect them and make their work 
possible, including by creating the conditions for academic freedom and 
institutional autonomy. The state is always an important actor, even in 
countries with a strong tradition of self-regulation. The state remains 
crucially important even as international education expands continuously 
and dramatically. The state is not disappearing from higher education in 
the age of internationalization. 
Perhaps surprisingly, CEU itself is a good illustration for the continuing 
key role of the state. We are an international university, possibly one of 
the most international in the world. That is not only because we hire 
faculty and enroll students from almost all countries of the world, but 
also because we are one of the very few universities worldwide without 
a national majority in the student body. Also, we do not have a national 
intellectual agenda or curriculum. Still, we recently clashed with a partic-
ular state, the Hungarian state, to the point that our very existence was 
at stake, at least here in Hungary. To address this, we sought the support 
of various non-state national and international constituencies and this 
support did come in, overwhelmingly. But it still might not work, as it did 
not work in the case of universities in Turkey, where international support 
changed nothing because the government did not change its stand. It 
looks like our best chance is another state, the State of New York, which 
is now negotiating with Hungary so that the Hungarian government puts 
in place regulations and legislation that protect rather that undermine 
our institutional integrity, and allows us to continue. We are an interna-
tional university, and yet we absolutely need the support of a state, to 
guarantee our autonomy and, to a large degree, our academic freedom 
as well. We cannot work otherwise. We are an international university, but 
we cannot be stateless, we cannot operate without a state around us. 
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Lessons from CEU and Other Universities 
What we learn from this short analysis, I believe, is something that might 
not be comfortable and easy to accept. It is a reaffirmation of the old 
Humboldtian principle that it is the responsibility of the state to protect 
the university, to ensure its autonomy and also the conditions for its 
academic freedom. And there is something more frightening here—and 
if I am proven wrong I would be happy to accept it. Only the state can 
ensure autonomy, not civil society, or other non-state actors, including 
international actors. Look at the demonstrations in Hungary. As impres-
sive and large as they were, they did not change much by themselves. 
Nor can international organizations fulfill this role—just see the minimal 
effects of the Council of Europe or the European Union putting pressure 
on Turkey and Hungary. The same applies to the broader “ internation-
al community” or the “court or the public opinion.” Here again, if we 
look at Turkey currently, or consider the situation in higher education 
in Serbia under Milosevic, international pressure could not change the 
state of affairs with regard to autonomy. The Serbian Parliament adopted 
a repressive new law on higher education in 1998, with immediate and 
drastic effects on autonomy, affecting the work of all universities, many 
academics, students, and administrators. The adoption and brutal imple-
mentation of the law generated a broad and strong reaction in Europe by 
many universities and organizations working in higher education, which 
advocated restoring the academic and managerial autonomy of Serbian 
universities. Only that the law stayed in place until the regime changed 
altogether. These examples do not mean that civil society, international 
organizations or universities themselves don’t have a role and respon-
sibility. But the key, I would say, is in the hand of the state. The state can 
turn academic freedom on and off. Non-state actors must engage directly 
with the state to have an impact. 
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This is the second important lesson here. In order to have good arrange-
ments for university autonomy as a pre-condition for academic freedom, 
we need to engage with the state. This might sound trivial, but it is not at 
all. Think of the international organizations, foundations that are doing 
capacity-building in countries where there is no or limited institutional 
autonomy, and do this by working exclusively with universities in those 
countries. This approach is wrong. Those who want to help, from the 
outside, must engage directly with the state as well. One cannot ensure 
autonomy working only with or on universities. Remember that the key is 
in the hand of the state.
A final question: if we accept that we need to engage with the state, can 
this work—and if yes, how? When I say “we,” I mean whether we are a par-
ticular university directly engaged in acquiring, defending or promoting 
its own autonomy or other actors (other universities, international orga-
nizations, etc.) trying to help. This is a long discussion. I would only like to 
say, based on direct experience, that engagement with the state can work. 
Let me give one example. The CEU Elkana Center has done a lot of work 
in Myanmar over the past few years trying to support capacity-building 
in universities but also to promote changing the national regulatory 
framework with regard to autonomy. Last summer we were invited by the 
new Minister of Education in the fabulous city of Naypyidaw. He started 
the meeting by quoting the eight dimensions of university autonomy 
we proposed in the Practical Handbook on University Autonomy that we 
prepared two years earlier to inform the discussions regarding the reform 
in this area in Myanmar.3 We have done this work in direct and stubborn 
contact with national authorities, starting already with the last military 
government, and it looks like this approach worked. We also learned in 
the meeting with the Minister that the drafting committee for the new 
higher education law (still to be adopted at this time) has put language 
3 Liviu Matei and Julia Iwinska, “University Autonomy: a Practical Handbook” (Buda-
pest, 2014).
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from our Handbook into the draft higher education law. It is remarkable 
and unexpected that a small university like CEU may have an impact 
in a large country 7,000 miles away, but this example does show that 
engagement with the state and national authorities for the cause of pro-
moting institutional autonomy is possible and can be effective.
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I would like to offer some reflections based on my experience of working 
and studying in the UK and in India. Earlier in January this year, I took up 
the position of Vice Chancellor of the Asian University for Women (AUW) 
based in Chittagong, Bangladesh. Established in 2008, AUW is neither 
a private nor a public university; rather an international university funded 
predominantly by individual donors, corporations, trusts and foundations. 
It enjoys considerable academic freedom, with the Board of Trustees 
drawn from all over the world. The Board is chaired by the former Foreign 
Minister of Bangladesh and has two ex-official members as trustees, in-
cluding the Secretary for Education and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 
Nearly 60% of our faculty are from overseas, primarily from North Amer-
ica. So, unlike other public and private universities in Bangladesh, AUW 
enjoys immense academic autonomy by virtue of its international status. 
However, in the wider context, academic freedom in both India and Ban-
gladesh is increasingly under threat and the crisis includes academics 
being subject to severe sanctions including suspension, firing, imprison-
ment and even violence. 
— Nirmala Rao is Vice Chancellor 
of the Asian University for Women, 
Chittagong, Bangladesh
Academic Freedom in the UK, the Indian Subconti-
nent and Bangladesh — Nirmala Rao
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Academic Freedom in the UK
In the UK, such freedom, though real, is relatively intangible, compared with 
other countries, due primarily to the absence of any formal guarantees of 
liberty in the British Constitution. Despite this, academic freedom has always 
been taken for granted and freedom of thought and speech is among the 
most prized civil liberties in the UK. But recently there have been growing 
political and social pressures which have become a serious menace to ac-
ademic freedom in British universities. In the past, religious pressures were 
more problematic: they were an outstanding feature of the middle years of 
the 19th century at Oxford and Cambridge and mainly responsible for setting 
up University College London (UCL) and King’s College in 1828 and 1832 
respectively and, indeed, the University of Durham in 1832. By comparison, 
in most European countries, as we all know, Universities have always been 
state institutions, and professors and teachers predominantly either civil 
servants or in the last resort subjected to state control. However, those who 
created the new universities of the 20th century in the UK took the contrary 
view that universities should be self-governing, autonomous institutions.1 
Pressures in the English context are changing, including the rapidly in-
creasing financial dominance of central government, pressures of growing 
expenditure and pressures from regulatory bodies. More importantly, 
proponents of business interests fund research projects in universities, 
who cannot reasonably be expected to provide funds unconditionally and 
without accountabilities. That said, it is difficult to judge how far this inde-
terminable pressures on the scientific and technological departments of 
British universities has become a menace to academic freedom over time. 
The changing nature of funding for UK research increasingly determines 
the nature of dissemination of research findings into the public domain. 
1 Lord Chorley, “Academic Freedom in the United Kingdom,” Law and Contemporary 
Problems 28, no. 3 (January 1963): 647, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1190651?orig-
in=crossref.
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This includes the dominance of the research excellence framework, the 
economistic approach of the research councils and the commercializa-
tion of research that dictate priorities. Likewise, the Teaching Excellence 
Framework determines the level of fees universities can charge, which 
in turn depends on how well institutions perform on a range of quality 
measures. As I speak the results of the Teaching Excellence Framework 
were released this morning. 
Figure 1. Source: UNESCO, Global gross expenditure on research and development
The question we must answer is how far the existing arrangements within 
universities ensure academic freedom? When terms and appointments, con-
ditions of appointment and dismissal of staff remain in the hands of authori-
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ties, they can seriously curtail freedom. The freedom of an individual teacher 
to write, teach and research according to his or her consciousness depends 
in the last resort on him being safeguarded from dismissal, should one’s atti-
tude and actions become displeasing to the university authorities. Academic 
freedom depends much more on tradition, on the culture of the organization 
and driven by public perceptions rather than by legally established rules. 
British universities also seem more intent on monitoring and controlling 
the way in which academic staff take part in public debates. The Univer-
sity of Leeds attracted media attention a couple of years ago for using its 
social media policies to reprimand a lecturer who publicly criticized the 
Home Secretary. Under the name of counter-terrorism, further regula-
tions were conceived. There is a growing climate of self-censorship on 
campus as well as a sense that some issues, particularly related to secu-
rity and anti-terrorism, are too ‘hot’ to handle. More recently we’ve seen 
demands from students for greater racial sensitivity and representation 
of non-white cultures at the institutions. Campaigns by students in uni-
versities such as Oxford and the School of Oriental and African Studies 
have called for the de-colonization of the curriculum and the campus. At 
Oxford, protesters removed the statues of colonial figures like Rhodes or 
Christopher Codrington, while at SOAS protesters removed white philos-
ophers to bring the curriculum and reading list in line with the School’s 
focus on Asia, Africa and the Middle East.2 They argued that they are too 
Euro-centric and ignore works by people of color. 
Academic Freedom and the Indian Subcontinent
Academic freedom is at the crossroads at the Indian subcontinent. The 
role of universities and the ability of academic staff to speak out on 
2 Aftab Ali, “Oxford University Students Call for Greater ‘Racial Sensitivity’ at the Insti-
tution and Say It Must Be ‘Decolonised’ | The Independent,” Independent, 2015, http://
www.independent.co.uk/student/news/oxford-university-students-call-for-greater-ra-
cial-sensitivity-at-the-institution-and-say-it-must-be-10332118.html.
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a range of issues has become a central concern. Power and control have 
become more centralized, resulting in a dramatic decrease of faculty au-
tonomy. Instead of providing oversight and overall coordination, admin-
istrators are taking decisions, even academic decisions, with less input 
from faculty. Faculty who openly disagree with administration can be rep-
rimanded, actions that are generally supported by courts. One by-product 
of this is the appointment of people for academic positions who support 
government policies. And we’ve been seeing a lot more of this since 
2014, when the current ruling party appointed senior administrators who 
support the political party and also support student-led groups, which 
align themselves with the ruling party. They can silence any opposition on 
campus, those who are not in line with the current government’s policies 
and those from the opposition who do not necessarily agree with the 
policies of the day. Although free press and democratic elections are the 
norm, free speech is circumscribed to conform to cultural and religious 
norms. Documentaries and films exploring religious conflicts have been 
withdrawn on many campuses after individuals received threats. Con-
troversial issues conflicting with society, such as caste and gender-re-
lated issues, frequently create a climate that manifests itself in a lack of 
support or validation for research. The result is that academics develop 
a sense of what can be researched and what is better left unstudied and 
unquestioned. 
Let me put forward a couple of examples. The award-winning book on the 
Hindus by the former President of the American Academy of Religions, Wen-
dy Doniger, is banned from Indian classrooms because traditionalists view 
the text as an attack on Hinduism. Another book by Doniger on Hinduism 
was also placed under review by experts before reprinting.3 This practice of 
either banning a book or forcing a severe backlash is becoming increasingly 
3 William Tierney and Nidhi S. Sabharwal, “Debating Academic Freedom in India,” 
AAUP Journal of Academic Freedom 7 (2016), https://www.aaup.org/JAF7/debating-aca-
demic-freedom-india#.WbD-bMhJZTM.
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common. What one writes and studies can result in suspension of services, 
public controversy, withholding or suspension of publications. I know this 
sounds very dramatic but that is the reality in India now. Two universities 
prohibited professors from addressing the media after academics made 
statements criticizing anti-terrorism policies. The Nobel Prize winner Am-
artya Sen stepped down as Vice Chancellor of the newly created Nalanda 
University because of what he perceived as governmental attacks on aca-
demic freedom.4 ‘Scholars at Risk,’ the human rights organization devoted 
to the protection of academic freedom, has published numerous accounts 
of Indian academics who have been arrested, beaten or in some instances 
imprisoned or killed, because of what they’ve said in the classroom or what 
they’ve written. There is a real fear both in India and Bangladesh of vigilante 
reaction for unpopular or uncommon ideas in both countries. 
Figure 2. Source: Scholars at Risk: Academic Freedom Monitor
4 Amartya Sen, “Academic Freedom Becoming Alien Thought in India: Amartya Sen - 
Times of India,” The Times of India, February 22, 2017, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.
com/business/india-business/academic-freedom-becoming-alien-thought-in-in-
dia-amartya-sen/articleshow/57291168.cms.
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Figure 3. Source: Scholars at Risk: Academic Freedom Monitor
Curricula in India and in Bangladesh are another issue. They are cen-
trally prescribed. Committees create courses, syllabi with readings, and 
professors are instructed to teach from those materials. If one wants to 
deviate from the curriculum, permission needs to be granted by the fac-
ulty committee and ultimately governmental authority. The result is that 
an instructor who wishes to teach for example, Salman Rushdie’s Satanic 
Verses or the recently banned India’s Daughter, a 2015 documentary by 
Leslee Udwin about the rape that occurred in New Delhi, would be unable 
to use either.5
In cases like this, autonomy is curtailed and academic freedom infringed. 
All these examples speak of the governmental intrusion into the affairs 
of the university and the limits of academic freedom. In some worst 
cases individuals are harassed, jailed or physically harmed. Academic 
freedom to teach and conduct research without fear becomes even more 
important in a system undergoing massification such as in India, where 
the social composition of students in universities has moved from being 
elite homogeneous to a much more diverse body. That diversity in itself 
5 Tierney and Sabharwal, “Debating Academic Freedom in India.”
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brings students with different backgrounds and different ideologies, who 
have a very different view of understanding and shaping what academic 
freedom is all about. 
I want to conclude by saying that my own inclination is to ask, how do 
these developments alter the state’s responsibility to protect incursions 
into academic freedom? Can an increasingly intolerant society accommo-
date academic freedom at all? And what do formal liberties mean, if de-
structive intangibles can so easily erode protections otherwise provided? 
With those questions in mind, my own pessimistic bias is to say that aca-
demic freedom cannot operate in the medieval mode of gated communi-
ties. Intolerance outside will gulf every community and the university will 
be no exception. Academic freedom and tolerance need to be cultivated 
as public and civic virtues. Without these, these values will become even 
more vulnerable, so that the shield of the university cannot protect them 
anymore from the waiting assaults.
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Several commentators in this volume, for example Allison Stanger, raise 
the question about the fragility of our values. We have seen a rise of 
populism and nationalism almost everywhere in Europe even if, for the 
moment, we are in a period of respite and hope. But we do not know how 
long it will last and it raises a terrifying question for all of us to answer: 
Can democracies die?
I will focus on the universities I know best, the universities in continental 
Europe. The focus is often on the Anglo-Saxon model as described by 
Nirmala Rao. But the continental model is, despite considerable variation, 
more widespread. The continental model is based on public universi-
ties. It is largely state-funded universities, although private universities 
exist too. For the most part, these universities don’t have campuses and 
campus life nor campus governance and everything that goes with it. Yet 
there are structural similarities which all universities have in common. 
Relating to Jonathan Cole’s commentary, I would also argue that what 
makes a good university, no matter where it is or how it is governed, is 
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the fact that it must be upsetting. Therefore, I want to explore the ques-
tion: What is upsetting nowadays in continental European universities?
I would like to start with some historical contextualization. There were 
two historical watersheds in the recent period of continental European 
universities. The first one was the end of communism. Hungary as well 
as other former communist countries have been struggling with recon-
structing and modernizing their universities. The second break came with 
the developments that occurred in Western Europe around 1968. This 
was the time of student revolts, and the experience was very upsetting. 
It brought the end of a long historical period of the German type of 
Ordinarienuniversität, the hierarchical university. The student revolt broke 
the monopoly of this type of university. It occurred among other chang-
es within the wider society. In France, Servan-Schreiber lamented in the 
late 1960s about Europe being left behind compared to the US in terms 
Figure 1, Source: OECD
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of innovation and economic competitiveness. In the US, Harvey Brooks, 
an astute science-policy adviser who was also advising the OECD, wrote 
an influential report urging European political leaders to open up their 
universities for a higher percentage of their citizens to enroll in higher 
education as a necessary step to boost economic competitiveness.
What were the effects of these developments? With the opening of the 
universities, student numbers increased. The opening was accompanied 
by waves of so-called democratizations within universities and governance 
structures were changed. Professors now had to share their decisionmaking 
Figure 2, Source: UNESCO, Global 
gross expenditure on research and 
development
Figure 3, Source: UNESCO, Global 
gross expenditure on research and 
development
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power with students, with representatives of the administration and with 
younger colleagues. This resulted partly in chaotic situations that could not 
last. Besides, being state-funded meant that some hidden interdependency 
with the state and ministries that were providing the funding were main-
tained. The road towards university autonomy was and still is a long one.
It also became clear that the aspired democratization was not compat-
ible with the ideal of efficiency as preached by neoliberalism. Starting 
in the UK and increasingly brought to continental Europe, universities 
introduced audits, assessments and evaluations of all kinds. Universities 
are held accountable and have to sign complex performance agreements, 
detailing their teaching, research and outreach obligations. All of this is 
now taken for granted. It has become part of university governance. The 
downside is that for many continental European universities, the broad 
mission of taking in increasing student numbers was not matched by 
adequate increases in state funding. There was increasing pressure inside 
universities to cope with limited resources. There is now outside pres-
sure to perform according to numerous assessment and benchmarking 
exercises. If one looks at international university rankings, continental 
European universities tend to have a very bad student-staff ratio which 
pushes them down in the overall rankings.
So, these are some of the upsetting pressures that European universities 
are exposed to right now. What is most upsetting, however, is the loss of 
free time. Time has become an extremely scarce resource. It comes with 
the loss of experimental spaces inside the university, spaces for discussion 
and generating new ideas. The Humboldtian ideal, referred to by several 
contributors in this publication, seems to be on its way out. But you don’t 
have to go back to Humboldt’s time. Most members of my generation have 
experienced their student life as something where we enjoyed lots of time 
and freedom to discuss, engaging in topics related to our naive beliefs 
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of how to improve the world—all this is threatened to be lost. This is the 
greatest threat that I see for most continental European universities now. 
What is to be done? I think we have to engage much more with what is 
happening at the interface, the multiple exchanges and various kinds of 
communications that take place between science and society. I see a dif-
ference here between Europe and the US. The difference is partly rooted 
in the 19th century concept of Wissenschaft which still pervades Scandi-
navian languages, Dutch, German and others. Wissenschaft is inclusive 
and the social sciences and humanities are part of it. In Anglo-Saxon 
countries, science means the natural sciences only, excluding the social 
sciences and humanities. This is a fundamentally different way of looking 
at the world. This idea of science being one, the concept of Wissenschaft, 
makes it easier to reach out and communicate with society. It enables to 
Figure 4, Source: Eurostat
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bring what happens in society into the university and universities may 
respond by becoming ‘unsettling’.
Altering the relationship between science and society started with the 
natural sciences. They were first in line when a loss of trust set in, be-
ginning with the nuclear power controversy, followed by controversies 
about genetically modified organisms and others. Those were big topics 
discussed inside and outside the university. Natural scientists had to 
respond to the challenge. At first, they reacted rather naively, thinking it 
is enough to inform the public. They had to learn quickly that this simply 
does not work. What followed were various bottom-up initiatives, partly 
helped through state-sponsored initiatives to stimulate more public en-
gagement on the part of university researchers. Thus, the idea of citizen 
science emerged and these various efforts created a window of opportu-
nity to speak with society and to listen to what society has to say. Para-
doxically, the social sciences were late in this engagement. The pressure 
was less and many social scientists thought that they are in contact with 
society anyhow, knowing what’s going on. However, there is a key differ-
ence in doing research on people and doing research with people. 
I’m not trying to paint an ideal picture here of European continental uni-
versities. They are far from being a mirror of society, although the ideal of 
meritocracy implies to include the most talented from wherever they come. 
We have done rather badly in terms of diversity if one looks, for instance, 
at student numbers from the generation with a migration background. 
Universities have not kept up with the way ethnic diversity has become 
part of European societies today. There is a lot of work to be done also in 
trying to anticipate what kind of solutions European societies will need for 
the problems of tomorrow. In order to be ‘unsettling,’ universities need to 
be competent, but also to have the courage to live up to their ideals. This is 
what CEU has done and hopefully will be able to continue doing.
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It is a pleasure to be here at CEU, a university that is resisting closure in 
an exemplary way. Indeed, you empower us all. I am here as a member of 
a university in Turkey whose faculty members have engaged in a number 
of joint academic research projects with faculty members at CEU. I am 
also here as a member of the academy in a country where academic free-
doms eroded in an unprecedented magnitude during the past year. There 
was a bloody coup d’état attempt in July 2016 that resulted in the death 
of 250 citizens, most of whom were people who went out to the streets 
to stop the coup. Since the failed coup attempt, over 5,000 academics in 
public and private universities have lost their jobs. 
1,128 academics calling themselves “Academics for Peace” signed a state-
ment in January 2016 calling for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and 
an end to the ongoing atrocities against Kurdish citizens in the southeast-
ern provinces of Turkey and saying: “we won’t be a party to this crime.” 
This is what you would normally expect from public intellectuals in the 
face of human suffering and that is exactly what they were doing with this 
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statement. Yet, this act resulted in the imprisonment and purge of many 
of these academics who signed the statement.
In the aftermath of the state of emergency, academics have been facing 
a series of purges. The biggest purge came on September 1, 2016, when 
40,000 public employees were dismissed, including 2,346 academics who 
were purged from various universities in Turkey. Another big purge came 
on October 29, 2016, resulting in the dismissal of 1,267 academics, followed 
by the purge of 631 academics on January 6, 2017; and 335 academics on 
February 7, 2017. The most recent purge prior to this conference at CEU 
came on April 29, 2017 when 484 academics from various universities were 
purged (the figures were gathered from the website of Scholars at Risk). 
All of these purges were realized though executive decrees that are –as 
we all know- prevalent measures in states of emergency. After the July 
coup d’état attempt, 15 universities with alleged links to the religious 
community led by Fethullah Gülen, viewed as the main culprit behind 
the coup d’état attempt, were closed. Many colleagues were imprisoned. 
Some are unable to leave the country because their passports were con-
fiscated. There have been two cases of suicide. My dear colleague Umut 
Özkirimli published an article in the latest issue of the journal Globaliza-
tions titled: “How to Liquidate a People” which is a tribute to one of these 
academics.1 There has also been a hunger strike by an academic and 
a teacher. They were arrested on the 76th day of their strike. The hunger 
strike continues and in terms of permanent damage to their health, they 
have passed the point of no return.
Some academics left the country either by resigning from their positions 
and finding employment abroad or through sabbaticals and unpaid 
leaves. Some are unable to leave since their passports have been re-
1 Umut Özkirimli, “How to Liquidate a People? Academic Freedom in Turkey and Be-
yond,” Globalizations, May 22, 2017, 1–6, doi:10.1080/14747731.2017.1325171.
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voked. Some are persistent in staying. It is not easy to stay, but it is not 
easy to leave either. Scholars in Turkey are finding themselves more and 
more cornered while still feeling a sense of responsibility towards their 
undergraduate and graduate students who continue their studies. The 
predominant feeling among them is one of frustration and desperation. 
It is not the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic that members 
of the academic community are facing challenges. There were similar 
moments in 1933, 1948 or after the 1960 and the 1980 military coups. The 
1933 purge was followed by the employment of Jewish professors who 
were deported from Nazi Germany although their European identity was 
more emphasized than their Jewish identity at the time since that would 
be in line with the Turkish state’s official rhetoric of Westernization. The 
main motive behind the 1948 purge was anti-communism, leading to 
a communist witch hunt in universities. These were followed by purges 
in the aftermath of the 1960 and 1980 military coups. Still, the academic 
purges of the past year are quite different in terms of scope, intensity and 
magnitude. There is an atmosphere of paralysis since many purged aca-
demics are unable to leave the country and accept employment offers in 
other countries for their passports have been confiscated. Many academ-
ics argue that those who are purged are virtually sentenced to a “civilian 
death” without trial since they cannot take public office anywhere else 
and are not hired by private institutions for fear of retribution.
There is an emphasis laid on the global challenge to academic free-
doms in this conference. I think, what I have just described points to the 
extraordinary state of the academy in Turkey. Nevertheless, I believe the 
global challenge is also there albeit in a different magnitude.
When President Trump signed an executive order at the end of January 
blocking entry to the US by the citizens of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Su-
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dan, Syria, and Yemen; 17 prestigious universities including Harvard, Yale, 
and Stanford launched a legal challenge to this ban. They underlined 
that the ban threatened their ability to attract international students and 
academics they needed to meet their goals of “educating tomorrow’s 
leaders from around the world.” In a joint statement, the universities de-
clared that “by prohibiting persons from freely traveling to and from this 
country, the executive order divides students and their families, impairs 
the ability of American universities to draw the finest international talent, 
and inhibits the free exchange of ideas.”2
The president of Johns Hopkins University—which is among the 17 uni-
versities legally challenging the ba—said that the executive order “takes 
our country down the ominous path of erecting barriers not on the basis 
of a demonstrated security threat but on the basis of religion.” He also 
said that “the order stands in unambiguous opposition to our country’s 
long-cherished values and ideals.”3 
On February 10, 2017, the Deans of Yale and Harvard Law Schools, Robert 
Post and Martha Minow, respectively, published an op-ed in the Boston 
Globe titled “Standing Up for ‘So-called’ Law.”4 The title of the piece was 
in response to a tweet by Donald Trump, who mocked and referred to 
Judge James Robart who blocked the travel ban as a “so-called judge.” 
President Trump tweeted: “The opinion of this so-called judge, which 
essentially takes law enforcement away from our country, is ridiculous 
and will be overturned!” The op-ed by the deans of Yale and Harvard Law 
Schools is of historical importance. They state the following: 
2 Harriet Agerholm, “Harvard, Yale and Stanford Sue Donald Trump over His ‘Muslim 
Travel Ban,’” The Independent, February 14, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/americas/harvard-yale-stanford-suing-donald-trump-muslim-ban-law-
suit-us-immigration-restriction-a7579886.html.
3 Ibid.
4 Martha Minow and Robert Post, “Standing up for ‘so-Called’ Law,” Boston Globe, 
February 10, 2017, https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/02/10/standing-for-
called-law/VLbDYmrwpdjCn8qs5FPJaK/story.html.
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We are deans of respected law schools. We have dedicated 
our professional lives to the proposition that law over-
rides violence with reason. Law stands for what we have in 
common, not merely what divides us. Law respects dis-
agreement; it patiently considers evidence and advocacy; 
it engages with the views of all. Each person—not just each 
citizen—is equal before the law (…) If Trump believes he can 
make an enemy of the law and of the Constitution, then he 
has truly become a foe of the Republic, despite the oath he 
swore at his inauguration. The craft and professional culture 
of law is what makes politics possible; it is what keeps poli-
tics from spiraling into endless violence. By questioning the 
legitimacy and authority of judges, Trump seems perilously 
close to characterizing the law as simply one more enemy to 
be smashed into submission. At risk are the legal practices 
and protections that guard our freedom and our safety from 
the mob violence that destroyed democracies in the 1930s 
(…) If we are to keep the rule of law, it must not be a parti-
san question; it must not be the concern simply of lawyers. 
We must all defend it, passionately and whole-heartedly. 
Without the rule of law, we may have a “so-called” presi-
dent who has in fact become a tyrant. Fundamentally, this 
moment is not about Trump. It is about all of us.5
These are historically significant statements of our times. They empower 
all academics around the globe who are staging a fight not only to main-
tain academic freedom but also freedom of expression, two significantly 
distinct phenomena. 
When we talk about setting a high standard for free speech, we almost 
always mean the freedom of speech of those with whom we disagree or 
5 Ibid.
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who have ideas we may even find distasteful. I think that one must fight 
hateful speech not by repression but by more speech. Hateful speech 
cannot be effectively condemned by means of “hiding behind the robes 
of judges” but rather uplifting public deliberation (an expression used by 
Timothy Garton Ash in 2011).6 In the US, this is called the First Amendment 
tradition. How, then, is it possible to uphold such a standard under the 
existing conditions in Turkey? What can you do as a scholar when you 
encounter executive decrees that lead to the purge of thousands of aca-
demics, the closure of universities, and travel bans? What do you do when 
your ideals and the reality on the ground are oceans apart? How can you 
be a scholar upholding ideas akin to the First Amendment tradition in 
a place where academics are imprisoned for speaking their minds and 
putting their signature on a statement against violence and for peace? 
How can you continue to be a scholar when nuances are lost; when a to-
pography of concrete prevails?
To conclude, I would like to emphasize a point Joan Scott made about 
the tension between raison and raison d’état, between truth and state 
power. When a state with all its authorities regards itself under siege, due 
process and reason are inevitably lost. Living in an environment where 
reason is surrendered to raison d’état is like the death of intellect and 
wisdom. It signals the “triumph of the will” (as in the film by Leni Riefen-
stahl commissioned by the Nazis). In my first book (1999, in Turkish) titled, 
Cumhuriyet Iradesi, Demokrasi Muhakemesi (Republican will, democratic 
reason), I had underlined how upholding the will to follow in primary and 
secondary school education can be detrimental for democratic ideals.7 
Whenever the will to follow a pre-designed path is glorified over reason, 
intellectual conflict is eliminated and one is encouraged to take sides in 
6 Timothy Garton Ash, “To Fight the Xenophobic Populists, We Need More Free Speech, 
Not Less,” The Guardian, May 12, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/commentis-
free/2011/may/12/fight-xenophobic-populists-need-free-speech.
7 Ayşe Kadıoğlu, Cumhuriyet Iradesi, Demokrasi Muhakemesi : Türkiye’de Demokratik 
Açılım Arayışları (Metis Yayınları, 1999), http://www.metiskitap.com/catalog/book/4315.
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order to exist. Today, it is very difficult to exist as a scholar who thinks 
intellectual conflict is good for the survival of differences; and rather 
than eliminating such differences, it is important to agree on how to 
disagree. Today, this is a minority position in Turkey and in a world where 
the self-righteousness of true believers (whether they are religious and/
or nationalist) prevails. It is that space that is in need of recovery today. 
Towards that end, it is important to continue international academic col-
laborations and engage in solidarity with colleagues without falling into 
the trap of seeing them only as victims to be pitied for they are trying to 
survive this ordeal in dignity. It is important to continue to value their 
scholarship. A respectful gaze rather than pity is needed by scholars who 
are struggling for academic freedom.
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Let me begin with a historical allusion. In 387 BCE, the philosopher Plato 
founded a research and teaching center. He located it in a donated grove 
of trees, a garden, in what was then a suburb of Athens. The donor’s 
name flowed over into the name of Plato’s school, the “Academy,” and 
into the rubric for the activities of higher education, “Academia.” Among 
Plato’s pupils was Aristotle, who went on to found his own center, the 
Lyceum. In 86 BCE, a Roman general, Sulla, pillaged the Lyceum. Centuries 
later, in 529 CE, after Christianity had become the official state religion of 
the Western and Eastern branches of the old Roman Empire, the emper-
or of Byzantium, Justinian, closed Plato’s academy. He was suppressing 
“pagan” schools, books, and icons.
In brief, the history of religious and state control of inquiry is long and 
deep. As Jonathan R. Cole has written: “The defense of academic freedom 
is never easy.”1 Seeking control, authorities and institutions have many 
weapons at their command, so many that self-censorship can seem to 
1 Jonathan R. Cole, “Academic Freedom under Fire,” in Who’s Affraid of Academic 
Freedom?, ed. Akeel Bilgrami and Jonathan R. Cole (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2015), 15.
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be a prudent response to one’s looming censors. Authorities can strip 
individuals of their passports, visas, rights to speech on any media, 
livelihoods, freedoms, and life itself. Authorities can strip institutions of 
their money (that power of the purse), accreditation (that power of the 
license), physical security (that power of violence and force), and legal 
identity (that power of dissolution). As a mechanism of control, states 
can decide when to enforce certain laws or when to let violations slip. 
They have the ability to structure uncertainty into their governance and 
to keep academics or journalists or artists or any oppositional figure off 
balance. However, a certainty remains: books can go up in flames; the 
internet can go down in the prison house of silence.
The fears of academic freedom are lively and numerous. If potential-
ly freedom gives voice to error, it can disrupt “good order.” Potentially 
“treasonous,” it can be a danger to the authority of the state. Potentially 
“blasphemous,” it can be a danger to a faith. Then, its intellectual errors 
are moral errors. I have greater sympathy with another ancient and mod-
ern fear: that it corrupts the young. Most parents of students love their 
children and understandably ask what might happen to them and to the 
values of their family in a free-wheeling classroom. The growth of higher 
education, its “massification,” has brought many more students with fami-
lies, and their “family values,” into classrooms.
Yet, the resistance to the control is equally deep and far more creative. 
For the resistance affirms rather than negates human potential. I was an 
adolescent when I learned that Galileo (1564-1642) was a hero. For he saw 
reality anew and afresh. Although his thought was suppressed, history 
vindicated him as a founder of modern science. I was an undergraduate 
in a liberal arts college for women when I read Plato and Aristotle, 
without fear and with much favor. As a tenured professor in an American 
research university, I am the privileged beneficiary of the struggle that 
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has installed academic freedom as a bedrock, often legally protected, 
principle of the modern university. As Cole also writes, “ (…) freedom of 
inquiry is our reason for being.”2
Because I teach for two months 
each spring at New York Univer-
sity Abu Dhabi, which celebrated 
its fourth graduation in May 2017, 
I have assumed that I am to com-
ment on the Gulf States. On my 
office door in Abu Dhabi is a blue 
and white poster, with the decla-
ration, in Hungarian and English, 
“I stand with CEU.” I am an outsider, 
a non-expert participant-observer 
of higher education in the Gulf, 
one who is far more conversant with my home country, the United States. 
Limited though I am, I suggest that we first rehearse again, no matter how 
briefly, a complex argument about the limits of academic freedom.
The now-classical theory about academic freedom concerns the free-
dom of academics as academics. As academics, they occupy a special 
place and space, that of rational thought and inquiry. At the risk of being 
misunderstood, let me remind us of a famous statement by Kant. In 1784, 
he was under the comparatively benign rule of Frederick the Great, then 
alive but to die in 1786. Kant wrote, “Only one prince in the world says, 
‘Argue as much as you will, about what you will, but obey.”3 Since the late 
19th and all of the 20th century, statements defining the classical theory 
of academic freedom and its boundaries abound. Among them is: 
2 Ibid., 55.
3 Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties (Der Streit Der Fakultäten), 221.
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Freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying 
out research and disseminating and publishing the results 
thereof, freedom to express freely opinions about the ac-
ademic institution or system in which one works, freedom 
from institutional censorship and freedom to participate in 
professional or representative academic bodies.4
Supporters of this classical theory also correctly realize that they should 
justify their freedom by demonstrating how they serve society, in time 
present and future. Dissent fuels well-being and progress. a pragmatic 
example: if you shut down the universities in Venezuela, you will destroy 
the next generation of doctors. Nor is academic freedom absolute. Anoth-
er pragmatic example: defenders of academic freedom cannot condone 
such disrespectful behaviors as coercing students into a fawning accep-
tance of a teacher’s prattlings. 
Logically, the classical theory of academic freedom includes a belief in 
a high degree of institutional autonomy. a university must be able to 
make academic decisions and shape its identity as a place of teaching, 
research, and service. How bizarre, how unproductive, how wrong it would 
be for a professor to speak and write under the protection of academic 
freedom - only to have a minister of education unilaterally fire that pro-
fessor at the minister’s whim and will. 
Yet, the norms of modern democracies and global human rights have 
gained some greater traction. They include the freedom of expression 
and association. I was a schoolchild in 1948 when the UN General Assem-
bly “adopted and proclaimed” the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Article 18 reads: 
4 UNESCO, “Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching 
Personnel” (1997), http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13144&URL_DO=DO_
TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
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Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his re-
ligion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
Following it is Article 19: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
As a result of this evolution, academics can now speak as citizens. Their 
identity has become a dual one: they are professional academics, and 
they are professional academics who are political citizens. What the 
rights of citizens are and what they ought to be is one of the disputed, 
defining bloodier questions of our time.
The American literary scholar David Bromwich is one proponent of 
this position. He writes: 
(…) the limits of academic freedom should not be narrower 
than the limits of intellectual freedom (…) It is the right of 
the scholar to think, write, and speak whatever he or she 
wants to think, write, and speak (…) Understood in its broad 
and libertarian sense, academic freedom is a category of 
political freedom.5 
5 David Bromwich, “Academic Freedom and Its Opponents,” in Who`s Affraid of 
Academic Freedom?, ed. Akeel Bilgrami and Jonathan R. Cole (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2015), 27.
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In contrast, he declares, with a tinge of sarcasm, this is the position of his 
opposition. 
You are free (…) to say whatever you think within your 
discipline, by virtue of the license conferred by disciplinary 
training and the possession of a corresponding expertise 
(…) So long (…) as you go on producing knowledge (…) you 
retain the right to make whatever assertions you please. 
But when you step out of the bounds of your productive 
province, you forfeit all protection.6
Contrary to the stereotypes that I have heard expressed with irritating 
frequency, the Gulf States are highly diverse amongst and within them-
selves. The seven emirates of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are differ-
ent from each other. Abu Dhabi is not Dubai. The Emirates are not Saudi 
Arabia. If I might overgeneralize, I would say that they are the legatees 
of ancient and invaluable civilizations, but they are comparatively recent 
modern states that have ruling families. These states have often evolved 
out of political relations with Great Britain and the dynamics of these 
families. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was formed in 1932; Kuwait in 
1961; Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates in 1971. They may have 
a high proportion of ex-patriate workers and inhabitants, about 90% in 
the UAE, who are not citizens. The Gulf States are also Muslim. 
In May 1981, in Saudi Arabia, six of the Gulf States formed the Gulf Co-
operation Council (GCC). They were Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, 
Bahrain, and Oman. The GCC charter speaks of “special relations, com-
mon characteristics and similar systems founded on the creed of Islam.” 
The charter also describes a great purpose of the GCC as the formulation 
of “similar regulations” in “Economic and financial affairs/Commerce, 
customs and communications/Education and culture.” Like the Middle 
6 Ibid., 31.
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East as a whole, higher education has grown tremendously. In the entire 
region, university enrollment is up by nearly 50% in the last 10 years. 
97% of the universities in the Arab world were created after 1950; 70% of 
those did not exist in 1991.7 The rise of higher education is one sign of the 
states’ capacity for change.
Recently, for at least three reasons, the conditions in the Gulf States, and 
by extension for higher education and academic freedom, have become 
even more complicated. One, well-known, is economic, the price of oil, 
the revenues of which fund such public goods as education. The second, 
also well-known and destructive, is the war in Yemen, which many ana-
lyze as a proxy struggle between the regional rivals of Iran and Saudi Ara-
bia. Some specific results include attacks on campus protesters, campus 
bombings, and the occupation and closure of campuses. a branch of ISIS 
reportedly threatened students at the University of Aden with bombings if 
the campus did not become sex-segregated, ban music, and hold collec-
tive student prayer. War enables the state to crush dissent in the name of 
the flag and national security.
The third reason is very recent. On June 5, three members of the GCC 
(Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain) blockaded a fourth member (Qatar). 
Egypt, and then other states, joined them. The President of the United 
States, Donald J. Trump, ferociously supported them - even if not all the 
members of his cabinet did. The ostensible motive for this dramatic “spe-
cial relations”- shattering move against Qatar is its support of terrorism. 
In the UAE, the attorney general wrote of Doha’s hostility and reck-
lessness. In order to protect UAE national security, its interests, and its 
public, he ordered that any show of “(…) sympathy on social media or by 
any other means of communication is a cybercrime punishable by law.” 
7 Scholars at Risk Network, “Universities in a Dangerous World: Defending Higher Ed-
ucation Communities and Values,” 2016, https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/10/SAR-2016-Global-Congress-Report.pdf.
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Offenses could lead to fines of Dh 500,000 or prison sentences of three 
to 15 years.8 Other consequences for academic freedom and educational 
institutions are unclear, but as I speak, there are some reports of diffi-
culties for non-Qatari students and faculty in Qatar or Qatari students in 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, or the UAE.9
Even before the June 5 actions, Lisa Anderson, a highly respected and expe-
rienced scholar of the Middle East, could say, “There is much worry about 
academic freedom in the Arab world.”10 One organization that monitors 
and documents violations against academic freedom, and protests against 
them, is Scholars at Risk (SAR). Founded in 2000, hosted at New York Uni-
versity, it is a global network of nearly 500 higher education institutions. 
SAR is concerned with academic freedom both in its classical sense and in 
its more recent connection to human rights. It protects threatened schol-
ars, helping to find positions for them if they must go into exile or become 
refugees. SAR also serves as an advocate for academic values. Since its 
founding, SAR has had over 2,600 requests for assistance from nearly 130 
countries. The largest percentages are from the Middle East and North Af-
rica, with the most distressing of increases from Syria and Turkey. Sub-Sa-
haran Africa and South Asia follow. With sorrow, we are also following 
Venezuela, where social institutions, including education, are collapsing. 
SAR now publishes an annual report, Free to Think, a product of our 
Academic Freedom Monitoring Project. In our 2016 issue, we described 
158 attacks on academic freedom in 35 countries—from travel restrictions 
8 Thamer Al Subaihi, “Supporting Qatar on Social Media a Cybercrime, Says UAE At-
torney General,” The National, June 7, 2017, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/support-
ing-qatar-on-social-media-a-cybercrime-says-uae-attorney-general-1.31515.
9 Aisha Elgayar, “Arab Students Caught in Regional Conflict With Qatar,” Al-Fanar Me-
dia, June 13, 2017, https://www.al-fanarmedia.org/2017/06/arab-students-caught-re-
gional-conflict-qatar/.
10 Scholars at Risk Network, “Universities in a Dangerous World: Defending Higher 
Education Communities and Values.”
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to killings, violence, and disappearances.11 Of them, only 2 are in the 
Gulf (Kuwait, the UAE). The reports from Turkey and Egypt far outnumber 
those from the Gulf States. However, SAR’s current concerns in the Gulf, 
which include difficulties before 2016, include some denials of entry into 
a country for academic purpose and four imprisonments, where we also 
fear for the physical health of our scholars. Three of them are in Bahrain, 
all in the STEM disciplines; one is in the UAE, in Economics. 
The Gulf States are no more immune to the contours of the modern uni-
versity and to the new technologies of information than any other region. 
For example, the UAE Constitution/Basic Law, written in 1971 and made 
permanent in 1996, has a preamble that calls for a gradual 
(…) dignified and free constitutional life, and progressing by 
steps towards a comprehensive, representative, democratic 
regime in an Islamic and Arab society free from fear and 
anxiety (…). 
Part III, Article 30 then states that 
Freedom of opinion and expressing it verbally, in writing or 
by other means of expression shall be guaranteed within 
the limits of law. 
Yet, “the law,” when promulgated, can demand respect for the symbols of 
the UAE, its laws, religion, rulers, ruling families, and government.
In my experience, some universities might exercise a limited version of 
classical academic freedom. a recent faculty handbook in a major public 
11 Scholars at Risk, “Free to Think: Report of the Scholars at Risk Academic Free-
dom Monitoring Project,” 2016, https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/11/Free_to_Think_2016.pdf.
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institution in the UAE, Zayed University, calls for a balance between aca-
demic freedom and “students’ sensibilities and (…) national cultural con-
text.” It writes of a “cultural and legal environment (that) is characterized 
by the imperative to be respectful of Islam, as well as all social groups.” 
In a suggestive comment, it also draws a comparison between itself and 
“faith-based institutions in the United States.”12 Another accommodation 
is to create enclaves of academic freedom in public and private institu-
tions. An enclave is a space that is carved out, with varying degrees of 
protection and varying arrangements, in which certain freedoms can be 
exercised or entertained. 
A prominent example of an enclave is near Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, the 
King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST), a co-educa-
tional graduate university founded in 2009. Reading a recent KAUST “Fac-
ulty Handbook,”13 I felt often an eerie similarity to one that an American 
research university might issue. Arguably, it is superficially easier to sup-
port academic freedom in science and technology than in the humanities 
and social sciences. Other examples might be the “American” universities 
or the branch campuses of American universities, for example, those in 
Education City in Qatar. 
The enclave with which I am most familiar is New York University Abu 
Dhabi, a United States liberal arts research university. Significantly, the 
Emirate set up both traditional universities and two other models of 
Western education at about the same time: a branch of the Sorbonne, 
and the Masdar Institute of Science and Technology, associated with MIT. 
The agreement between the government of Abu Dhabi and New York 
University guarantees academic freedom on campus. That is to the great 
12 Office of the Provost, “Zayed University Faculty Handbook,” 2009, http://www.zu.ac.
ae/main/files/contents/edu/docs/accr/faculty_handbook.pdf.
13 King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, “Faculty Handbook,” 2015, 
https://academicaffairs.kaust.edu.sa/faculty-affairs/Documents/Faculty Handbook 
2015-16 (updated 22 Mar 2016).pdf.
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credit of the government. Although the university is not in the socially re-
laxed precincts of Greenwich Village, and although it has made mistakes, 
I have never felt any violation of that agreement. I am, however, a tran-
sient, an admitted visitor with a syllabus, in Abu Dhabi. I am not a politi-
cal citizen of the UAE. Nor do I pretend to be. I am a political citizen of the 
United States, a feminist, a believer in LGBTQ rights, a civil libertarian, and 
a beneficiary of the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights. I have 
a dual identity and responsibilities.
I teach a course on “Law and the Imagination” to wonderful undergrad-
uates from about 110 countries, some of them from deeply authoritarian 
and repressive and violent regimes. For many of them, the campus is 
a respite. We begin with “The Code of Hammurabi,” parts of “Exodus” and 
Sophocles’ “Antigone.” We end with the “Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.” I have excellent colleagues. I have witnessed them do work of 
real value within the enclave that has effects outside of it. The colleagues 
I most admire are vigilant about academic freedom and about them-
selves. They are wary about being cultural imperialists or self-righteous 
prigs. They also refuse to delude themselves about the tensions of living 
within an enclave. They are smart, have humility, and are, willing to admit 
error. In other words, they are genuine scholars.
To be too succinct: when I teach at New York University Abu Dhabi, I am 
grateful for the classical theory of academic freedom. When I speak 
as a United States citizen, I am grateful for modern theories of human 
rights. Given the number of authoritarian governments in the world, be 
they secular or religious, academic freedom needs both theories in active 
practice in order to flourish.
No matter how imperfectly, I am also aware of the realities of visions, of 
faiths, of aesthetic worlds, of cognitive dissonance, of the malleability of 
74
ideas and information, of passions, and of appetites. I do, after all, study 
literature. However, Plato was one of my tutors about reason. When I first 
encountered “The Phaedrus,” I gained the ancient metaphor of the Chario-
teer in his sweaty, intense struggle by and for reason. The same liberal arts 
college that gave me Plato also gave me Kant, not that I understood him. 
However, I can return to him and to The Contest of the Faculties. He writes: 
Now the power to judge autonomously—that is, freely (ac-
cording to principles of thought in general) is called reason. 
So, the philosophy faculty, because it must answer for the 
truth of the teachings it is to adopt or even allow, must be 
conceived as free and subject only to laws given by reason, 
not by the government.14
Whether on the large globe or in the smallest, dustiest university, our be-
lief in academic freedom, and our defense of it, is nothing less than our 
subscription to reason itself.
14 Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties (Der Streit Der Fakultäten).
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Academic Freedom and Attacks against it in the US from 
a Historical Perspective
I want to begin with an assertion, which I believe is supported by facts: 
You cannot have a truly great university without a deep commitment to 
the institutionalization and adherence to academic freedom and free 
inquiry. Below I illustrate a hierarchy of core values of universities. You 
will notice at the very foundation of that hierarchy are two fundamental 
enabling values: trust, and academic freedom and free inquiry. These are 
enabling because, without them, I don’t believe you can achieve meri-
tocracy and some of the other values which are in the hierarchy itself. 
Academic freedom and trust are at the very core of what we do; at the 
heart of our existence in creating and transmitting knowledge.
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Mitchell Mason Professor of Columbia 
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I also want to note that attacks on academic freedom are not new, 
certainly in the United States. From the very beginning of the turn of the 
20th century, we had the attacks and firing of the distinguished econo-
mist and sociologist, E. A. Ross at Stanford, who was critical of Leyland 
Stanford as a railroad magnate and for his views on eugenics. There were 
an enormous number of firings related to faculty members’ opposition 
to conscription prior and during World War I, as well as their responses 
to the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts. Nicholas Murray Butler, 
Columbia University’s president, asserted in his 1917 Commencement 
address that there isn’t going to be any tolerance or questioning of the 
American entrance into the First World War:
Figure 1. Source: Jonathan R. Cole, Toward a More Perfect University  
(Public Affairs, 2016).
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What had been tolerated before became intolerable now. 
What had been wrongheaded was now sedition. What had 
been folly was now treason. In your presence I speak for the 
whole University…. When I say… that there will be no place at 
Columbia University, either on the rolls of its faculty or on 
the rolls of its students, for any person who opposes or who 
counsels opposition to the effective enforcement of the laws 
of the United States, or who acts, speaks or writes treason. 
The separation of such person from Columbia University will 
be as speedy as the discovery of the offense.
There were similar statements at the time made by the president of Cor-
nell, Edmond Ezra Day:
(…) a man who belongs to the Communist Party and who 
follows the party line is thereby disqualified from 
participating in a free, honest inquiry after truth, and from 
belonging on a university faculty devoted to the search for 
truth.
and by Yale’s president, Charles Seymour:
There will be no witch hunts at Yale because there will be no 
witches. We do not intend to hire Communists.
Nicolas Murray 
Butter
Edmond Ezra Day
Charles Seymour
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Whether they were red scares, or the repression took some other form, 
academic freedom itself has been periodically under attack in the United 
States for over 100 years. During the McCarthy period and the Second Red 
Scare, great scientists like Linus Pauling, who won two Nobel prizes, and 
who might have won a third for the discovery of the structure of the DNA, 
had he not been hindered in that effort because he was being hounded 
by the FBI, while being denied the opportunity to go to England to accept 
membership in the Royal Society. Many people think he would have dis-
covered the DNA structure before Watson and Crick. 
The great defender of academic freedom was Robert Hutchins at the Uni-
versity of Chicago. He said during the Red Scare and the famous Illinois 
legislature’s Broyles inquiries into communism on university campuses, 
especially at the University of Chicago:
The danger to our institutions is not from the tiny minority 
who do not believe in them. It is from those who would 
mistakenly repress the free spirit upon which those 
institutions are built (…) The policy of repression of ideas 
cannot work and has never worked. The alternative is the 
long, difficult road of education.
In a further statement, Hutchins said that the problem with witch hunts 
was:
(…) not how many professors would be fired for their be-
liefs, but how many think they might be. The entire teaching 
profession is intimidated.
Robert Hutchins
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He suggests that when you have apprehension and you scare professors 
because of threats to their freedom to express their views or pursue their 
research ideas, which may run contrary to the received wisdom, then you 
have the entire teaching profession intimidated and the concomitant ef-
fect of their refusal to take on new subjects and express contrarian ideas. 
During all periods, be it the Vietnam War or the aftermath of 9/11, one can 
see attacks on aspects of free inquiry. For example, the Bush administra-
tion politicized the Center for Disease Control. During the post 9/11 period 
Congress tried (as it had before) to curtail peer review, and it tried to 
eliminate NSF funding of political science research that was not related 
to national defense. It made an effort to limit the publication of biologi-
cal research that it thought could aid terrorist groups. The FBI searched 
scientists’ laboratories. Currently, we see threats to eliminate the Nation-
al Endowment of Humanities or the National Endowment for the Arts. In 
sum, there have been many dark periods over the past century where ac-
ademic freedom and ideas of free inquiry have, in fact, been under attack. 
Today, we can observe a disturbing new development: attacks that are 
coming from inside universities rather than from external authority. The 
unlikely source has been university students. Historically, students have 
by and large been expansionists for free expression and for tolerance of 
free inquiry. One can point to instances that are only vaguely related to 
academic freedom where students have protested work on campus: for 
example, the efforts by students during the Vietnam War to eliminate 
classified military research from university campuses. They succeeded 
in that protest. But today, many students are beginning to question the 
foundation of free inquiry and academic freedom at universities. These 
protests have taken the form of insisting that campus speakers with 
opprobrious points of view not be permitted to speak on campus, that 
faculty should provide “trigger warnings” when teaching books that could 
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be offensive to some subgroup of the university community, that uni-
versities should disinvite Commencement speakers from giving talks on 
campus, and that professors should be limited in what they can discuss 
in their classrooms. Universities are called upon to provide “safe intellec-
tual spaces” for vulnerable students, and universities are being pushed to 
take punitive action against what some students perceive to be “micro-
aggressions.” To be sure, academic freedom requires physical safe spaces 
for discourse to take place, but it also requires that we respect various 
points of view among speakers, even when the point of view is opprobri-
ous to some. 
Two fundamental sources of academic freedom in the US
The fundamental principles of academic freedom have been expressed 
well in two reports originating at The University of Chicago—separated by 
roughly a half-century. The first set comes from the 1967 Kalven Commit-
tee Report which is only three pages in length and yet powerfully lays out 
a few basic tenets about the university and academic freedom: 
A university faithful to its mission will provide enduring 
challenges to social values, policies, practices, and 
institutions. By design and by effect, it is the institution 
which creates discontent with the existing social 
arrangements and proposes new ones. In brief, a good 
university, like Socrates, will be upsetting. (…) [It] must 
embrace, be hospitable to, and encourage the widest 
diversity of views within its own community. It is not a club, 
it is not a trade association, it is not a lobby. (…) The 
neutrality of the university as an institution arises then 
not from a lack of courage nor out of indifference and 
insensitivity. It arises out of respect for free inquiry and the 
obligation to cherish diversity of viewpoints.
Herry Kalven
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I’m not sure that our students, when they enter the university today, have 
any concept that one of the missions of a great university is to confront 
their biases and presuppositions, to challenge them, not necessarily 
to have them abandon their ideas, but at least to learn how to defend 
them. Part of the Kalven Committee Report—which was produced during 
turbulent times—states that the university is a community, but one 
where nobody, including the rector, the president, or the trustees speak 
for the university. The University is a community of individuals. The idea 
is fundamentally not to encroach upon or intimidate the views of any 
minority in the community. Then the neutrality of the university arises out 
of courage. 
Sixty years after the Kalven Committee Report, the University of Chicago 
published another report on free expression, which I shall call the Stone 
Committee Report since Professor of law and former Chicago Provost 
Geoffrey Stone chaired the committee. Finally, I’ll end with a statement by 
John Etchemendy, the longtime provost of Stanford University. The short 
Chicago document lays out the role of free expression on campuses, 
expression that is closely linked to academic freedom:
(…) it is not the proper role of the University to attempt 
to shield individuals from ideas and opinions they find 
unwelcome, disagreeable, or even deeply offensive. 
Although the University greatly values civility, and although 
all members of the University community share in the 
responsibility for maintaining a climate of mutual respect, 
concerns about civility and mutual respect can never be 
used as a justification for closing off discussion of ideas, 
however offensive or disagreeable those ideas may be to 
some members of the community.
Geoffrey Stone
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If that is the position at the University of Chicago, it may not be the rule 
at other institutions of higher learning. However, John Etchemendy, the 
outgoing Provost of Stanford University, in a talk to Stanford Trustees, 
reinforces the concerns of the Stone Committee Report:
I am actually more worried about the threat [to the 
university] from within. Over the years, I have watched 
a growing intolerance at universities in this country—not 
intolerance along racial or ethnic or gender lines—
there, we have made laudable progress. Rather, a kind 
of intellectual intolerance, a political one-sidedness, 
that is the antithesis of what universities should stand 
for. It manifests itself in many ways: in the intellectual 
monocultures that have taken over certain disciplines; 
in the demands to disinvite speakers and outlaw groups 
whose views we find offensive; in constant calls for the 
university itself to take political stands. We decry certain 
news outlets as echo chambers, while we fail to notice the 
echo chamber we’ve built around ourselves
The speakers at this conference consider these principles and discuss 
whether or not they go too far.
John Etchemendy
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Introduction
Traveling to the Academic Freedom conference, I enjoyed landing at a Bu-
dapest airport named for Franz Liszt. Later this week—in fact, tomorrow—I 
will touch down at Prague’s Vaclav Havel International Airport. I want to 
begin by holding up these relatively new names (2011 and 2012, respec-
tively) as an occasion for celebration. Could there be anything better for 
a lover of the arts and sciences?
I visited Budapest for the first time in 1983. My first trip to Prague was in 
1986. Both cities were then very different places. Though we seem to have 
returned to a dark hour in human history, it should give us all strength to 
remember that most of us gathered here have been fortunate witnesses to 
Central Europe’s rebirth. The lands of Beethoven, Mozart, Freud, Kafka, Musil, 
Haydn, Kertész, and von Neumann clearly have unlimited future potential.
Academic freedom is a foundation for both knowledge and human excel-
lence. It matters what is happening in universities, because democracy 
and liberal education are intertwined, as Joan Scott has so eloquently 
argued. I’ll confine my remarks to what I have learned over the past few 
— Allison Stanger is Russell J. Leng 
‘60 Professor of International Politics 
and Economics at Middlebury College
Lessons from Middlebury — Allison Stanger
86
months through my own personal experience. It won’t be scientific. I will 
not provide data. But perhaps some of my conjectures might be tested 
against those of others writing in this volume, sparking meaningful dia-
logue about what we value most.
The fragility of things most Americans take for granted is something I only 
recently came to know. Important values I took to be self-evident truths 
are currently facing the gravest of challenges within the Ivory Tower 
as well as beyond its confines, and that challenge is global. 
The Middlebury Incident
Student protesters disrupt speaker Charles Murray  
on March 2 at McCullough Student Center, Middlebury College 
(source: http://www.middlebury.edu)
Let me elaborate a bit on what happened to me this spring. Several of 
my students asked me to moderate a talk with the American Enterprise 
scholar Charles Murray. For those who don’t know him, Charles Murray 
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wrote a controversial book almost 25 years ago called The Bell Curve, 
which is what whipped students and faculty alike into a frenzy at the 
prospect of him speaking on campus. Although he was coming to talk 
about his 2012 book Coming Apart, which explores polarization in the 
United States and pretty much foresaw the election of Donald Trump, that 
fact was not significant to the protesters. They were stuck on what he was 
said to have written over two decades ago.
When my students asked me to engage with Dr. Murray by asking the first 
three or four questions, I agreed without giving it much thought. My stu-
dents know I’m a Democrat, but the college courses I teach are obviously 
non-partisan. I have a PhD in political science. I don’t need to tell you that 
academia is overwhelmingly left-leaning. In that context, it is especially 
important for any serious political science department to engage the full 
spectrum of political views. That is why Middlebury’s political science 
department co-sponsored the Charles Murray event. That is also why the 
American Political Science Association (APSA) publicly condemned the 
violence at Middlebury College, which “undermined the ability of faculty 
and students to engage in the free exchange of ideas and debate, thereby 
impeding academic freedom on the Middlebury campus.”1 
As I subsequently wrote in the New York Times, I thought that asking 
Charles Murray challenging questions was an opportunity to demon-
strate publicly my commitment to the free and fair exchange of ideas 
in my classroom.2 But as some of you may already know, Dr. Murray was 
drowned out by students who never let him speak, we were forced to 
retreat to another location to livestream our conversation, and he and 
I were intimidated and physically assaulted while trying to leave cam-
1 APSA, “Statement on Violence at Middlebury College on March 2,” 2017, http://www.
apsanet.org/Portals/54/goverance/2017/APSA Statement on Violence at Middlebury 
College on March 2.pdf?ver=2017-03-09-102506-453. 
2 Allison Stanger, “Understanding the Angry Mob at Middlebury That Gave Me a Con-
cussion,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/us/after-charlottes-
ville-violence-colleges-brace-for-more-clashes.html, March 13, 2017.
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pus. Charles Murray was 74 years old at the time. When I saw him being 
attacked, I did what any decent human being would do in those circum-
stances. I took his arm so that he would not fall, and that is when the 
hatred turned on me. 
So why did this happen in the United States of America, the land of the 
free? I have had ample opportunity to reflect on this question, and I think 
there are three principal reasons for it. First, the election of Donald 
Trump set the stage for over-reaction and misinterpretation. In that 
milieu, Charles Murray became a lightning rod that he might not other-
wise have been. Second, in the run-up to the talk, some members of the 
Middlebury faculty cheered on the protests and did not encourage their 
students to read Charles Murray, or listen to him first, before drawing 
their own conclusions about his work and his character. I can’t stress to 
you enough how significant that was for the events that followed. We had 
Middlebury faculty members acknowledging publicly that they had never 
read anything that Charles Murray had written, but because they had read 
a collection of pull quotes on the Southern Poverty Law Center website, 
they knew that Murray should not be speaking on campus.3 Third, some 
students believed that shutting down speech was a means to social jus-
tice. And some Middlebury professors shared that view, thereby encour-
aging radical action. 
In the days that followed my injury, a campus consensus seemingly 
emerged that the goals of inclusivity and freedom of expression were in 
3 Interestingly, in the aftermath of the Middlebury mayhem, President of the Southern 
Poverty Law Center Richard Cohen argued publicly against shutting down speech 
on college campuses. He told the New York Times in August 2017, “We might want to 
shame them, or think they are sick, but students have a right to listen to who they 
want to listen to, and we don’t have the right to censor that… Don’t give these fools an 
audience.” 
See: Dana Goldstein, “After Charlottesville Violence, Colleges Brace for More Clashes,” 
New York Times, August 16, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/us/after-char-
lottesville-violence-colleges-brace-for-more-clashes.html.
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direct conflict. Middlebury’s President Laurie Patton, thankfully, chal-
lenged this view. As she elaborated in a Wall Street Journal opinion piece 
in June 2017, nothing could be further from the truth, since free expres-
sion is the means to greater diversity.4 Yet the view that inclusivity and 
free speech are mutually exclusive had and will continue to have pop-
ular appeal, since it seems to embrace moderation. It comforted those 
pained by the conflict they were witnessing, both on campus and beyond, 
because it meant that one didn’t have to choose a side. Instead, one 
could stake out what seemed to be a middle position and thereby avoid 
conflict. One should not mistake this silence for a majority endorse-
ment of shutting down speech. Rather, a very vocal and radical minority 
successfully preempted the emergence of any moderate consensus at 
Middlebury in spring 2017.5 
There were quite a few brave souls, however, who immediately saw the 
foundation of the university under challenge and spoke out publicly. They 
organized a Principles of Free Expression petition that garnered over 
100 signatures from Middlebury faculty and was published in the Wall 
Street Journal in March 2017.6 I noticed three general patterns among the 
signatories. First, many supporters had studied or experienced intellec-
tual life under an authoritarian or totalitarian regime. Second, many of 
the signatories had lived in American red states and had loved ones with 
whom they disagreed politically. And finally, quite a few of the signatories 
were older rather than younger. Now I myself happen to fall into all three 
4 Laurie L. Patton, “The Right Way to Protect Free Speech on Campus - WSJ,” The Wall 
Street Jounral, June 6, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-right-way-to-protect-
free-speech-on-campus-1497019583.
5 AAllison Stanger, “Middlebury, My Divided Campus,” https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/ 
03/education/edlife/middlebury-divided-campus-charles-murray-free-speech.html, 
New York Times, April 3, 2017.
6 Jay Parini and Keegan Callanan, “Middlebury’s Statement of Principle,” The Wall 
Street Journal, March 6, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/middleburys-state-
ment-of-principle-1488846993.
and 
Free Inquiry on Campus, “Free Inquiry on Campus: a Statement of Principles by over One 
Hundred Middlebury College Professors,” 2017, https://freeinquiryblog.wordpress.com/.
90
of these categories. I should also add that professors from the sciences, 
mathematics, religion, and philosophy were disproportionately repre-
sented. In general, the signatories understood the critical importance of 
being able to agree to disagree, both for the sake of the community, free 
inquiry and even democracy itself. It was shocking to discover that I had 
colleagues who did not share our understanding of the academy’s and 
America’s core values.7 
How can we explain this conflict within the American academy? How is it 
possible for intellectuals in a free society to embrace censorship as an ac-
ceptable means? The short answer is that the proponents of shutting down 
speech or frightening off speakers don’t see themselves as censors. They 
see themselves as upholding free speech by righting power inequities. Set-
tling scores with someone like Charles Murray constitutes social justice. 
The best articulated version of this position comes from New York Univer-
sity’s Vice-Provost for Faculty, Arts, Humanities and Diversity Ulrich Baer. 
In an April 2017 New York Times opinion piece titled “What snowflakes 
get right about free speech,” Baer deploys the French post-structuralist 
philosopher Jean-François Lyotard in arguing “that some topics, such 
as claims that some human beings are by definition inferior to others, 
or illegal or unworthy of legal standing, are not open to debate because 
such people cannot debate them on the same terms.” Baer supports 
censorship and argues that free speech absolutists are the real censors 
in that they challenge the rights of minorities to participate in public 
discourse. Baer is therefore not “overly worried that even the shrillest 
heckler’s veto will end free speech in America.”8 In other words, Charles 
Murray and I deserved to be shouted down. 
7 For more on the Middlebury campus divide, see: Stanger, “Middlebury, My Divided 
Campus.”
8 Ulrich Baer, “What ‘Snowflakes’ Get Right About Free Speech,” The New York Times, 
April 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/opinion/what-liberal-snowflakes-
get-right-about-free-speech.html.
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As I am still suffering from a heckler’s veto concussion, I am perhaps not 
the best person to pronounce this line of reasoning specious. But I will 
note here that for those who have experienced life under communist or 
fascist dictatorship, it is an all too familiar argument. It is a position where 
ideology and groupthink call the shots, where harm to other humans is 
construed as collateral damage. As Vaclav Havel argued in his powerful 
1978 essay, “The Power of the Powerless,” ideology is “a specious way of 
relating to the world. It offers human beings the illusion of an identity, of 
dignity, and of morality while making it easier for them to part with them.”9 
After Donald Trump’s election, there is a dangerous idea taking hold on 
the American left that one must fight fire with fire. As a result, we now 
have an Alt-Left and an Alt-Right in the United States. The Alt-Left has 
embraced extremism in what they perceive as the only way to respond 
to Alt-Right extremism. In resisting Trumpism, they essentially advocate 
using Trump tactics. Democracy and reasoned debate have been and 
will be the main casualties, since the extreme left and extreme right are 
rebelling against liberalism itself. In this context, upholding freedom of 
expression protects all of us, because it gives individuals ways to dissent 
without resorting to violence. 
Central Europeans should know better. a divided left is precisely what 
enabled the Nazi revolution. Retaliatory laws from both left and right 
that undermine freedom of expression, assembly, and speech must be 
denounced, both here and in the United States. Germany learned from its 
mistakes and got this balance right after a totalitarian past. Hungary must 
do the same. And in so doing, Americans will continue to have much to 
learn from Central Europe.
Thank you.
9 Vaclav Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” http://www.vaclavhavel.cz, 1978, http://
www.vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=eseje&val=2_aj_eseje.html&typ=HTML.
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Classical definitions of academic freedom focused on freedom of re-
search and teaching. In the American context, the right of professors to 
speak freely as citizens outside the university has also been emphasized. 
But many recent controversies over academic freedom in the US—and 
I limit my comments to the US—have turned on speech inside the univer-
sity yet outside the traditional domains of research and teaching. 
Research and teaching continue of course to be central to the defense 
of academic freedom in the face of external pressures, notably from 
private and public funders, government regulators, and the populist right. 
But I have been asked to address internal threats to academic freedom. 
And while some internal controversies have focused on the freedom of 
research and teaching, many have focused on other issues. 
The most widely discussed of these controversies have concerned invita-
tions to controversial outside speakers. Public attention has focused on 
efforts by the campus left to “disinvite” or “de-platform” speakers such 
as Charles Murray at Middlebury and Milo Yiannopoulos and Ann Coulter 
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at Berkeley. These widely publicized incidents have already generat-
ed a substantial backlash: several conservative state legislatures have 
passed campus speech bills.1 The campus right has also sought to pre-
vent or disrupt events involving controversial (especially pro-Palestinian) 
outside speakers.
But there is another kind of internal academic freedom controversy that 
I would like to highlight. This concerns the freedom to speak out about 
issues of campus governance. Consider three recent examples. 
In March 2015, students at Northwestern marched carrying mattresses 
and pillows to protest an article by Professor Laura Kipnis, an outspoken 
feminist cultural critic. The Chronicle of Higher Education article criticized 
new institutional rules regulating intimate relationships between faculty 
and students and skewered what Kipnis called the mood of “sexual para-
noia” on college campuses. 2 Students petitioned the administration for 
an “official condemnation” of the article. Subsequently, two students filed 
formal title IX complaints against Kipnis on the basis of the article.3 This 
triggered a prolonged, quasi-judicial official investigation that eventually 
exonerated Kipnis. 
Later that year, Nicholas and Erica Christakis, the heads of one of Yale’s 
residential colleges, were the targets of massive student protests calling 
for their dismissal. The trigger was an email Erica Christakis wrote reflect-
ing critically—but in a thoughtful, low-key way—on an earlier email that 
had been sent by Yale’s Intercultural Affairs Counsel to all Yale students. 
The earlier email had called on students to avoid “culturally unaware or 
1 Conor Friedersdorf, “The Campus-Speech Debate Spends Summer Break in State-
houses,” The Atlantic, September 3, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ar-
chive/2017/08/the-campus-speech-debate-is-summering-in-statehouses/535608/.
2 Laura Kipnis, “Sexual Paranoia Strikes Academe,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
February 27, 2015, http://www.chronicle.com/article/Sexual-Paranoia-Strikes/190351.
3 “My Title IX Inquisition,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, May 29, 2015, http://www.
chronicle.com/article/My-Title-IX-Inquisition/230489.
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insensitive choices” in their Halloween costumes and provided guid-
ance for avoiding “cultural appropriation and/or misrepresentation.” In 
response, Christakis acknowledged “genuine concerns about cultural 
and personal representation” but worried about universities becoming 
“places of censure and prohibition” and about the loss of confidence in 
students’ capacity to regulate their own conduct without bureaucratic 
guidance from above.4
My last example concerns the protests that engulfed Evergreen State 
College in Washington in May 2017. Here too the trigger was an email, this 
one circulated by biology professor Bret Weinstein. Weinstein’s email 
criticized an official invitation to “allies” of “people of color” to absent 
themselves from campus for a so-called “Day of Absence” in order to 
attend a full day of workshops and other events addressing “ issues of 
race, equality, allyship, inclusion, and privilege” “from a majority culture 
or white perspective,” while the same issues would be addressed “from 
the perspective of people of color” in a full day of on-campus pro-
4 Christakis’ email can be read at https://www.thefire.org/email-from-erika-chris-
takis-dressing-yourselves-email-to-silliman-college-yale-students-on-halloween-
costumes/
Students carry mattresses and pillows 
to protest Professor Kipnis’ opinion 
piece. Illustration added by the editors, 
not the author 
(source: http://dailynorthwestern.
com/2015/03/10/campus/students-
carry-mattresses-pillows-to-protest-
professors-controversial-article/)
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gramming. This was a new twist on a longstanding Evergreen tradition, 
originally inspired by a satirical 1965 play depicting the chaos that results 
when the white residents of a southern town must cope with the sudden 
disappearance of the town’s black residents. In previous years, students, 
faculty, and staff of color had been invited to attend an off-campus pro-
gram discussing such issues, while allies had been invited to discuss the 
issues at on-campus workshops. Weinstein supported this tradition, but 
objected to the reversal of format, which he interpreted as a call for white 
students, faculty, and staff to absent themselves from campus.5 Weinstein 
had earlier criticized a plan to require an “equity justification” or expla-
nation for all faculty hires on the grounds that it would “[subordinate] all 
other characteristics of applicants to one thing.” Students demanded that 
Weinstein be fired; police advised Weinstein that it wasn’t safe for him 
to remain on campus; and 50 Evergreen faculty members signed a letter 
calling for a formal “disciplinary investigation” against Weinstein after he 
went to the media to tell his side of the story.
5 Weinstein’s email can be read at http://www.theolympian.com/news/politics-gov-
ernment/article153826004.html
Tweets by Bret 
Weinstein in the 
aftermath of the 
Evergreen College 
incident. The lower 
one, depicting 
Weinstein himself. 
Illustration added by 
the editors, not the 
author
(Source: https://
twitter.com/
BretWeinstein)
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These controversies have several things in common. Unlike many other 
campus controversies, they originated not in a clash between the newly 
emboldened campus right and the left, or between liberals and con-
servatives, but in a clash between liberals and the identarian left. Each 
controversy began with the articulation of liberal reservations about 
self-consciously progressive policies or practices pursued in the name 
of fostering inclusiveness and diversity on campus. And in each case, 
protesters did not seek to argue with the liberal critiques; they sought 
instead to stigmatize, delegitimize, and punish those critiques, treating 
them as outside the bounds of legitimate discussion. 
The calls for dismissal of the Christakises and Weinsteins and the launch-
ing of a formal disciplinary investigation against Kipnis are in my view 
strong grounds for including in formulations of academic freedom an 
explicit and unambiguous defense of the freedom to speak out about is-
sues of campus governance. Such speech should not simply be constitu-
tionally protected, but institutionally protected, that is, free from threats 
of internal sanction. a vibrant notion of academic freedom should defend 
the legitimacy of such speech, not simply its legality. 
Tweets by Bret 
Weinstein in the 
aftermath of the 
Evergreen College 
incident. The lower 
one, depicting 
Weinstein himself. 
Illustration added by 
the editors, not the 
author 
(Source: https://
twitter.com/
BretWeinstein)
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These controversies about campus governance reveal fundamental de-
bates about the particular kind of institution the university is and should 
be. Should universities be defined as spaces of freewheeling “debate, dis-
cussion and even disagreement” that may “at times (…) challenge you and 
even cause discomfort”? This was the view taken by a much-discussed 
University of Chicago letter to incoming students last August.6 
Or should colleges and universities be defined as spaces of mutual re-
spect and recognition, where speech is and should be carefully practiced 
and regulated out of respect for the sensibilities of vulnerable groups, so 
as to create a more truly inclusive and egalitarian learning environment? 
The goal of creating a more inclusive and egalitarian learning environ-
ment is a noble and important one. But pursuing this goal by policing 
speech and protecting feelings strikes me as misguided and dangerous, 
for three reasons. 
First, the paternalistic, subjectivist, and therapeutic stance that informs 
this approach—a stance that treats students as fragile beings whose 
feelings must be protected—risks limiting and disabling those it is intend-
ed to serve. a one-sided focus on protecting and respecting feelings is 
arguably much more limiting than a focus on cultivating and respecting 
capacities. 
Second, the paternalistic stance is embodied and expressed in an in-
creasingly influential and institutionalized discourse built on the concept 
of cumulative and systematic micro-aggressions. This discourse redefines 
and inflates the notions of “violence,” “trauma,” “assault,” and “safety” 
as well as “bias” and “discrimination”; it generates an ever-expanding cat-
6 From a letter of Jay Ellison, Dean of Students if the University of Chicago, to the 
class of 2020 students: http://www.intellectualtakeout.org/sites/ito/files/accep-
tance_letter.jpg 
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alog of harms caused by speech acts; and it cultivates and nurtures ever 
more exquisite forms of sensitivity to such harms. Most crucially, it makes 
feelings the ultimate arbiter of whether a harm has occurred. 
Third, the new campus paternalism makes everyone in the  university 
community responsible for anticipating—and thereby avoiding—the 
possible harms that their speech might cause. Failure to avoid the harms 
caused by speech acts—however unintended those harms might be—may 
be grounds for subjecting the speaker to disciplinary action. The prolifer-
ation of formal disciplinary investigations—often with minimal or inade-
quate procedural protections for the accused—has received considerable 
attention in the domain of sexual harassment,7 but investigatory bureau-
cracies have been expanding to other domains as well. 
These tendencies point in an increasingly and disturbingly illiberal 
direction. They threaten to transform the university from a space of free 
and unencumbered exchange into a space of constrained, monitored, and 
inhibited exchange. They threaten to remake the university into a disci-
plinary institution in the Foucauldian sense, one that seeks—through an 
expanding array of training programs and through the proliferation and 
expansion of investigative and disciplinary bureaucracies—to produce 
docile subjects who will speak in institutionally correct ways. 
But docile subjects are produced, most effectively, through anticipatory 
self-censorship. In a context in which harm has been redefined as sub-
jective offense, in which everyone is obliged to anticipate the possible 
7 See the statement issued by 28 members of the Harvard Law School faculty, voicing 
concerns about the new sexual harassment policies and procedures adopted by 
Harvard in 2014: 
Eugene Volokh, “28 Harvard Law Professors Condemn Harvard’s New Sexual Harass-
ment Policy and Procedures,” The Washington Post, October 15, 2014, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/15/28-harvard-law-profes-
sors-condemn-harvards-new-sexual-harassment-policy-and-procedures/?utm_term=.
e7a4631bd6c0.
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harms that their speech might cause to others, and in which that obliga-
tion is enforceable through formal and informal sanctions, self-policing 
and self-censorship become routine, and the exchange of ideas and 
opinions—in research, teaching, and discussions about campus gover-
nance—is restricted by the need to avoid any possibility of giving offense. 
This cannot help but have a massive chilling effect on campus speech. 
What is to be done? This is a difficult question, especially in the present 
American context, where liberal visions of the university are threatened 
not only, or even especially, from within, but also by much more powerful 
forces without, especially corporatization, privatization, conservative state 
and federal legislatures, anti-intellectualist right-wing populism, and of 
course a newly energized Alt-Right. The question is complicated by the 
connection between the threat from within and the threat from without: 
needless to say, events like the Evergreen and Yale protests or the Berke-
ley and Middlebury disturbances are red meat for Breitbart, Fox News, 
and conservative state legislatures. 
In this climate, it is difficult to find a space for a liberal critique. And 
liberal criticism of course risks being coopted by the right. Yet this is no 
reason for liberals to remain silent. As an unapologetic liberal, I believe 
liberals must become more visible and vocal in campus politics. I think 
we need to stand up and speak out on behalf of a liberal understanding 
of the university, rather than simply grumble privately about the slow 
erosion and marginalization of that understanding.
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I would like to preface my remarks with an analogy to the interwar period. 
As you may know, there was a satirical but prophetic novel published 
in Vienna in 1922 by Hugo Bettauer called Die Stadt ohne Juden, ‘The 
City without Jews’. It was a sharply drawn futuristic account of a Vienna 
purged of Jews. Bettauer’s fantasy (which was turned into a movie) be-
came reality in 1945. Bettauer described the most radical consequences 
of decades of Viennese political anti-Semitism so potently that he was 
assassinated by a self-professed Austrian Nazi in 1925. 
My approach to the question of what is happening now on the American 
campus is framed by the tacit assumption that one could paint a fu-
turistic picture of university life in the United States in which anything 
resembling academic freedom and the tolerance of reason and free 
expression would be absent. I project this nightmare as someone who is 
responsible for an institution in the United States and is worried every 
day that something terrible might happen on campus. The debate that 
rages now is not constructive. It is frightening. I’m not an expert in this 
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field but I sense danger and I want to describe how that danger appears 
to me in four points. 
The first point requires us to take sympathetically and seriously the 
(often younger) faculty and student critique in the United States of the 
principle and practice of free speech. Free speech is seen as a dated 
“liberal” ideological conspiracy maintained by powerful people, mostly 
white and older faculty, alumni and trustees, to maintain their power and 
sustain the university as an instrument of that power. The university is 
seen as allied with big business and with government, the primary sourc-
es of support for most universities, especially research universities. Free 
speech appears little more than the hypocritical moralistic conceit among 
those in control of the status quo, and is therefore a seemingly neutral 
ideal that supports a playing field that is not level in terms of race and 
class and is designed to keep everything in place just as it is. 
Why would an intelligent, well-meaning young person believe such a claim 
in the United States of America? Let me begin by adducing a few rea-
sons: Consider the radical inequality of wealth, the absolute visibility of 
excessive obscene wealth in the US, the persistence of poverty, under-
employment and the evidence of racism in the north and in the south, 
and the scandalously high cost of tuition and limited access to university 
education. Despite all the progress made since the end of World War 
II, these factors are evident to anyone, particularly the post-Cold War 
generations. Add to that the vulgar, blatant, dismissive attitude towards 
women, immigrants, and citizens of color, encouraged by our new elected 
president. And then add to that the controversy that surrounds the rights 
of people of differing sexual identities and orientations. There is a kind of 
dissonance between the rhetoric of free expression and free play of ideas 
on the one hand and the seemingly recalcitrant reality of discrimination, 
intolerance and inequity. Somehow the wrong ideas always win. Somehow 
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nothing changes, there is little progress despite all the rhetoric about the 
power of ideas to sort themselves out in a condition of freedom on behalf 
of truth and justice. This in part explains the level of anger which exists 
behind both the alt-right and the radical anti-fascist left movements. 
My second point is that we must confront the distortion and appropri-
ation of the anti-enlightenment academic discourse that flourished in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Today’s activists, who contest the traditions of free 
speech have absorbed somewhere, out of the ether, a reductive version 
of the post-positivist epistemological critique of knowledge. They believe 
there is actually no knowledge and no truth, and no privileged frame of 
reference that approaches objectivity. Truth is all subjective, and ema-
nates from the perspective of the viewer, rendering subjectivity, per se, 
legitimacy and authority. Someone told them a distorted fairy-tale about 
Einstein’s special theory of relativity: that everything is ultimately relative, 
and that there is no truth. Newton may have believed in truth but modern 
science has debunked that. Wrong as this may be vis-a-vis Einstein and 
relativity, the bowdlerizing of modern physics, from Schrödinger’s cat 
and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle to the frame of references in the 
special theory of relativity, ended up undermining the tools of reason, 
the principles of argument and the rules of evidence. Somehow the word 
got out, in no small measure courtesy of French structural theorists, that 
knowledge is a social construct, in which universal truths do not exist. 
The critics of free expression don’t believe that there are rational grounds 
to distinguish right from wrong. 
There is one glaring exception and that concerns the application of basic 
science. When it comes to being wheeled into an emergency room or 
getting on an airplane, the epistemological critique vanishes. No one 
gets on an airplane and says it is a conspiracy. Few choose to take on the 
task of creating a non-hegemonic, perhaps non-Western, not primarily 
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male-dominated alternative construct of air travel that is a sympathet-
ically subjective, less loud, less noisy, less polluting mode of getting 
across the ocean quickly. But there is a frighteningly large segment of ed-
ucated individuals who believe false claims about vaccination, deny the 
results of modern science regarding the treatment of disease and contest 
the results of climate science. But they are still in the minority and that 
is why scientists are the very best allies of the idea of free speech and 
academic freedom, because they still believe in evidence and in dis-
provability. For the rest of us in the university, in the social sciences and 
humanities, the idea that there is no legitimate basis for privileging one 
point of view over another holds a good deal of sway. Hence, there is an 
absence of confidence within the university about the rules of argument 
or methods of analysis or even in the nature and character of speech and 
language. The absence of consensus about the means and objectives of 
research and scholarship and their standards weakens the claim to free 
speech because the ideal of a free forum for the unfettered exploration 
of ideas from which a better or even the right answer or the truth will be 
found, is no longer a shared goal of our contemporaries, one fully un-
derstood or subscribed to. The legitimate critique of some mythical rigid 
positivist conceits that reigned before 1914 has run amok. 
The third point is that the privileging of subjectivity has taken hold at 
a time of radical displacement and anomie. Out there a powerful sense 
of loneliness and isolation prevails. It is supplanted by and compensat-
ed by the solace of membership in groups. The ideal of the individual is 
subordinated to membership in standardized notions of coherent com-
munities. I escape the terror of individuality by becoming a member of 
a group defined by sexual orientation, race or religion. Those groups may 
be reductive in their definition but they function on a campus socially to 
lessen the anxiety that the solitary experience of learning will in the end 
translate into isolation. Going to campus in the American university can 
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be a lonely experience. That’s why there are fraternities, and sororities, 
secret societies, and clubs. Students legitimately want to feel comfortable 
in a strange setting and they wish to be liked by their peers. The residen-
tial college and university is an unnatural situation. It boxes in people at 
the ages of 17 and 21 quite randomly into a single institution and expects 
civility. But there was never untarnished civility on the American campus. 
There was campus violence in the 18th and 19th century. The image that 
somehow once upon a time everybody was walking around as a kind of 
incipient scholar, who readily replaced violence for speech, is an histori-
cal myth. We are still more civilized than the Harvard and Yale of the first 
half of the 19th century, and we are probably ahead of the civility game 
in comparison to the age of the panty raids of the 1950s. The fact is that 
people are unsatisfied to be seen merely as individuals so they identify 
with groups and these groups happen now to generate their own sources 
of truth. Their perspective on the world is what seems to reign without 
question. And there is no appetite for criticism or empathy for dissent.
The subjective experience has deepened in this generation by the echo 
chamber provided by modern technology. Modern communication 
through social networks is virtual, as is friendship. Glued to their hand-
held devices, individuals are passively engaging in a world that is actually 
imaginary, independent of space, materiality and real time and in which 
a technological illusion of intimacy, sharing and connection is fostered. 
There is no public space they must share with others—an agora, pub-
lic square or even shopping mall to which all have access, which they 
have experienced, in which they meet others with whom their ideas and 
values might be contested. They connect online and form groups that 
are self-reinforcing. One does not emerge with the experience of how 
to defend a point of view against someone who differs but occupies the 
same neutral common ground, in real time and real space, on a train, on 
a plane, in a shop or town hall. 
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There is something ultimately cowardly about blogging, about putting 
notices on Facebook, and tweeting “likes.” What I say to someone face 
to face requires a bit more courage even than writing it and sending 
an opinion into the vast digital space. I have colleagues who are very 
civilized in the presence of others and monstrous on e-mail. They emu-
late road rage; when they get behind the wheel, rigidity and resistance 
to empathy and compromise prevail. I can always apologize to some-
one in a conversation and retract: “let’s forget what I said,” “I regret 
it,” or ‘You misunderstood me, actually I didn’t say that’. But the tweet 
and e-mail live forever, and they allow disputes never to be ultimately 
settled. When you post things, you cannot get rid of that post and you 
are going to apologize forever in vain. Technology undermines forgetting 
and forgiving, both indispensable acts in a civilized world. Technology 
allows the retrieval of the past beyond our natural memory and func-
tions as a huge reinforcer of differences. This makes compromise and 
agreement very hard for the younger generation that has not actually 
experienced traditional public space. You walk down any campus and it 
is amazing how few people are talking to one another. They are texting 
or they are listening to devices. That novel isolation is compensated 
for by deep virtual allegiances to particular groups. That is the campus 
echo chamber. 
My fourth point is that there is a growing moralizing intolerance with 
respect to any sort of deviancy. After all, a university, particularly its 
faculty, is a collection of deviants. There is no person who has been hired 
by a university of any quality who is not deviant by some demographic 
comparative measure. To be interested in classical languages, and to be 
interested in the fine points of poetry, quantum physics or any subject 
represented by the titles of articles or books published by university 
presses makes one by definition quite mad. To excel in the study of cell 
function or fossils and to be able to understand the questions of modern 
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physics makes one an outlier. Yet administrative, governmental and legal 
pressures call for standardization and pressure for all to behave strictly 
to norms and to resist one’s natural peculiarities and deviance. Faculty 
members are great as individuals because they are different, exceptional 
and resist being pigeonholed. And the university needs to protect them. 
But to control what exceptional individuals say, or how they behave, cuts 
against the qualities of deviance. One cannot segment the range and 
scope of exceptionalism. Nadia Boulanger or Marie Curie are unlikely to 
act in all ways in life just as your average person. Deviance that may be 
cognitive is probably linked, (though we do not know enough), to other 
forms of non-standard behavior. Eccentricity, even bizarre behavior is of-
ten aligned with talent and genius. Would Oscar Wilde succeed as a ten-
ured professor? Those of us who are administrators at the university 
understand that part of our job is to protect the freedom of thought and 
speech of the odd individual who has certain gifts from the rage and 
envy of others. In my field, which is music, there are nothing but impos-
sible but memorable and inspired personalities. It is a problem that the 
modern university now expects an increasing conformism in behavior 
as well as standardization of expressed thought. And that finally leads to 
a tremendous problem of self-censorship and passivity 
Allison Stanger mentions in her section that the faculty and staff who 
signed up for the defense of academic freedom were by and large older. 
This suggests people with more of a historical memory of the period 
before the Vietnam War and World War II, or at least a consciousness 
of those events. They are themselves probably more frightened of the 
consequences of intolerance. It is absolutely true that what we face is 
a kind of new version of what used to be very doctrinal old left-wing and 
fascist views of liberal conceits about free speech, debate and argument 
and resistance to the notion of the free press. And let us not overlook the 
inherent conflict between commerce and the free press and the corrup-
108
tion that comes from needing to make a profit with the news—facts that 
damage the ideal of the role of the free press in democracy.
Nonetheless, we need to strengthen the belief that is still out there in the 
notion of truth, freedom and rational judgment and the links between 
democracy, liberty and social justice. The barriers to spreading those 
convictions include liberal inadequacies, liberal conceits and hypocrisy. 
The idea that freedom of speech and the life of the university are part of 
a complex burden in the way of realizing progress and social justice in an 
imperfect world, is hard to convey.
I had to debate a respected scholar this past year who believed that the 
whole enterprise of the university is a mirror image of an oppressive 
society which is designed to prevent those who are disadvantaged from 
reaching a status of dignity and equality. In that view, a conflict between 
the ideologies of free expression in research and learning and that of 
social justice dominates. There is some truth there. And this is not new. 
This claim was inherent in Soviet and state communist theory. 
Now what is to be done about this? I have to say that my own view is that 
one has to have a sympathetic ear to why the younger generation, both 
faculty and students, don’t see what we see. We need to break out of our 
own echo chamber and be quite clear that free expression and the habits 
of critique, skepticism and self-examination are absolutely indispensable. 
I happen to believe in that deeply, having an Eastern European Jewish 
background and being an immigrant. It seems second nature to me. 
I think scientists are of enormous and underutilized value in the leader-
ship of universities in defending this. But I also think one has to hear very 
carefully that cloaked in the periodic craziness in which the American 
universities are now engaged, there is a severe reaction to a lot of un-
delivered claims in the American space. The disaffections go back to the 
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election of Ronald Reagan. They concern claims about economic oppor-
tunity, about social justice, freedom, the right to vote, and about actually 
confronting racism. We are taking down statues of confederate generals 
but we are not erecting memorials for all the people who were lynched 
and killed after the Civil War. a huge hypocritical piety persists some-
times in the rhetoric of the defense of free speech; that hypocrisy is what 
Trump exploits. There are questions surrounding medical care, education 
or social services in the United States, all in a catastrophic situation. The 
university is viewed as in some way papering over or even tacitly defend-
ing inequities and injustices. We have to find a way to counter that claim 
and separate what we do and the idea of freedom of speech and aca-
demic freedom from any tacit alliance with those injustices. 
We also need to defend the importance of language. One of the most 
terrifying things about the American campus now is the intent to identify 
what you stand for by the jargon you use. Hannah Arendt argued that real 
thinking starts when you find a way to use words differently. We need to 
resist identifying others using a reductive ideology marked by the use of 
certain vocabulary. It is the most noxious thing. a person in a university 
campus ought not be called to task for the use of vocabulary without any 
understanding of context, meaning or intent, let alone humor or irony. 
There is no way to make any kind of joke, even at the expense even of 
yourself. This is something that must be fought. But to fight it there must 
be more than generational moralizing. 
We are in a situation that reminds me of the late 60s where the radicals 
of the 30s could not understand why the radicals of the 60s wouldn’t 
listen to them. All they did was to moralize on the basis of “we were 
there” too. Pontification is not going to work when one seeks to sympa-
thetically understand why young people with good hearts and with great 
potential have been so unbelievably bamboozled by misrepresentations, 
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myths and the nonsensical. Take safe spaces. Critics ridicule the idea, 
even though the university in the past provided them—Cardinal Newman 
societies for Catholics and Hillel for Jews. Why object now to doing the 
same for others? 
With empathy, there may be a way around the crisis, but finding that way 
takes a lot of patience. I am quite optimistic. But I think the university 
must be self-critical about the extent to which it cuts a path to defend 
what we need to defend; academic freedom and critical discourse cannot 
be compromised. We need to find the means to assemble allies on be-
half of academic freedom and freedom of expression and realize a real 
commitment to address the issues of equity that seemed to have fallen 
off the agenda, even for the liberals since the Clinton era. This is why 
in some sense I think the election of Trump is a moment of dialectical 
opportunity; it has put an end to a certain complacency.
TAKING ACCOUNT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
IN HUNGARY
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Key Developments in Hungarian Higher Education 
— Attila Chikán
The last quarter of a century was very turbulent in Hungarian higher 
education, even for a transition country. When Hungary faced transition 
at the end of the 1980s, there was a clear need for major changes in the 
Hungarian university system and in higher education in general. Hungary 
was ranked among the last ones on enrollment figures in Europe, due to 
the policies of the Communist regime. The quality of higher education was 
rather mixed. There were some very good universities, some high-level 
faculties, but also faculties and departments that were not as good as we 
wanted. My university, Corvinus, was very lucky, because at the end of the 
1980s we had a program financed by George Soros, which made it possible 
for about 50 young professors to spend a year or at least a semester at 
the best American and Western European universities. This helped my uni-
versity to get prepared for transition. It was a fundamental experience for 
our faculty, who gained personal and direct impressions of what university 
education is like in the most developed regions of the world.
On the organizational end, higher education was very unstable. There were 
a lot of discussions about the number and capacities of universities and 
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higher education institutions. Hungary received funding from the World 
Bank to change the organizational structure, to have less institutions but 
higher overall capacity than we had at the time. The structural changes 
just started when the political transition introduced new turbulences. It is 
important to understand that the structural problems we are facing today 
are not new. Subsequent governments in Hungary after 1989 did not have 
a comprehensive policy for higher education. This led to constant insta-
bility. My university changed its faculty structure and its name four times 
in the past 25 years. This created an unfavorable environment for devel-
oping educational content. Financial resources were scarce and actually 
decreasing at universities. We were also very slow to respond to changes 
in the country; unfortunately higher education was not the driving force 
of intellectual change. Yet there was and there is gradual improvement 
in educational content. We have better courses, better educated teachers 
and better prepared and more talented students than 20 years ago. Even 
though we have a lot of problems with basic education, today’s students 
are better prepared to meet the challenges posed by new developments 
of the global economy and global society.
Since the second Orbán government started to operate in 2010, there is 
a general tendency of centralization in higher education. In that sense, 
what is happening with universities is not very different from what is 
happening in other areas of life and institutional developments in Hun-
gary. What is new is the appearance of political and ideological influence. 
When I was a department chair, member of the Senate and later Rector 
of Corvinus, I did experience much fewer attempts of political influence 
except through some financial pressures. Today we can observe striking 
examples of political influence, not only on the operational, but also in 
some cases at the academic level. This is very dangerous from the point 
of view of academic freedom. 
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In the early 90s, new laws were produced in all areas of life on 
a near-daily basis. The Parliament at that time worked like a machine, 
producing new laws which were tied to the ideas of market economy and 
the social developments we wanted to achieve. At the time, there was 
a heated debate whether we should follow a German or an Anglo-Saxon 
model in our higher education reforms. It was a meaningful debate and 
there were important arguments on both sides. In the end, we mixed 
the two, which was not very favorable, more or less inclined towards the 
Anglo-Saxon model. Fundamental questions were asked and answered 
in this process. There were not just minor changes in the curriculum or 
departmental reforms, but the whole philosophy of higher education and 
its role in society was at stake at the time. For example, the introduction 
of tuition fees was an important and interesting step. a number of pro-
fessors (including myself), students and student organizations supported 
it as a step towards market economy and market-driven society. In our 
mind, it was supposed to go hand in hand with a system of scholarships 
and social support for students. Unfortunately, the government at the 
time picked up on the tuition fees issue and abolished it. 
Legal changes in Hungarian Higher education: 1993-1999
1993
Higher education law [Law LXXX]
•  Warranting institutional autonomy.
•  Universities are run by a Senate and the Rector, little external 
intervention allowed. 
•  Establishes a system of doctoral schools similar to Western 
European and the US
•  Founding new universities by the Catholic and Reformed 
Church 
•  Efforts of making the Hungarian higher education compatible 
with international standards, including the acceptance of 
Hungarian diplomas abroad. 
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Legal changes in Hungarian Higher education: 1993-1999
1995 Introduction of tuition fees•  Abolished after a referendum in 1998
1999
Amendment of the Higher education law [Law LII]
•  Merges various institutions and reduces their number to 62
•  Centralizes the nomination of university professors to a state 
accreditation institution
•  Still allows extensive autonomy
Figure 1. Own compilation
There was almost permanent legal change, and from 2010 onwards, a new 
wave of centralization hit. The independence of universities was hurt in 
many ways. One of them was the introduction of the chancellor system, 
which is rather different from the chancellor system in US universities. 
True, the organization and financing of universities was not in order, there 
had to be changes. But the reform centralized a lot of the management 
of universities and distributed power between the rector and the chan-
cellor in a way that impacted the freedom of universities negatively. Of 
course, there are differences between chancellors of universities. In some 
places the system operates adequately, in other places not. But the idea 
itself was steered towards centralization. The 2017 change to the higher 
education law came as a surprise. Even though we had constant change 
with a tendency towards centralization, this one was a step towards 
politics-oriented instead of academics-oriented decisionmaking. It didn’t 
follow from the previous developments. 
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Legal changes in Hungarian Higher education: 2005-2017
2005
New Higher education law [Law CXXXIX]
•  Centralization of admissions and adoption of the Bologna 
system, 
•  Introduction of Economic Councils in the universities, 
supervising the economic management of the universities
2011
New Higher education law [Law CCIV]
•  Rectors nominated by the Minister and not the Senate 
•  Minister can centrally allocate the scholarships and tuition 
waivers available
2013 Constitutional amendment•  Restricting university autonomy in the basic law 
2014
Amendments to the Higher education law
•  Introduces centrally nominated Chancellors, deciding all 
financial and administrative issues 
•  Indirectly they can influence the hiring of teachers
2017 Amendment to the Higher Education law “Lex CEU”
Figure 2. Own compilation 
I would like to finish with some illustrations tot show that the current 
higher education policy is neither efficient nor favorable. The number of 
students is declining. Of course the population is declining too, but at 
a much smaller rate. 
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Figure 3. Source: Péter Radó, “A felsőoktatás állami megszállásáról és annak 
következményeiről,” Beszélő, May 22, 2015, http://beszelo.c3.hu/onlinecikk/a-
felsooktatas-allami-megszallasarol-es-annak-kovetkezmenyeirol.
It is even worse that higher education spending has been going down in 
the last few years. Though it slightly increased in 2015 and 2016 it is still 
far from the peak we started from. 
119
Figure 4. Source: Own compilation based on the yearbooks of the Ministry of 
Education / Ministry of Human Resources
What is also striking is that in terms public expenditure on tertiary educa-
tion, Hungary ranks at the end of the OECD measure, only Italy spending 
less as a percentage of its GDP. 
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Figure 5, Source: Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2016: OECD Indicators,  
OECD Publishing, 2016, doi:10.1787/eag-2016-en.
I think it is important to note that people are unhappy with the way high-
er education and education in general is developing in Hungary. There 
were several demonstrations by university students and high school 
teachers for academic freedom and for better education in general. 
I think it is important to understand that those people who are most af-
fected by the changes, those young people who face the higher education 
system today, would like to see a different way ahead. 
The problems of Hungarian higher education are very deeply rooted in 
their social and political background. Transition created in principle an 
opportunity to change some of the trends which we have experienced. 
But instead of that, the political intentions of the 1990s and 2000s have 
generally overruled academic considerations. Because of that, higher ed-
ucation as such could not move into the direction which both its own and 
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global requirements demanded. After the hectic developments described 
above, there were many expectations concerning the higher education 
policy of the Orbán government. It is disappointing that the government 
did not move closer towards the demands of education in the 21st century. 
Many rules and laws are in fact pointing towards the opposite direc-
tion. One of the most significant parts is the attack against CEU, which is 
a flagship of academic quality and freedom in Hungary. I think this is not 
what Hungarian society requires, and it is not what Hungary needs to get 
into a better position in an increasingly complex and globalized world. 
There is a need for a fundamental change of direction.
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University Autonomy in Hungary in Perspective 
— István Kenesei
As Professor Scott argued so eloquently in her introductory talk, universi-
ty autonomy is the prerequisite to academic freedom. Academic freedom 
on the other hand is the prerequisite for critical thinking. And from Karl 
Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery I have learnt that critical think-
ing is the bedrock of university-level education.1 
To draw some light on the state of university autonomy in Hungary, 
I would like to present some striking insights from the latest European 
University Association survey, based on data from 2015 and 2016.2 It men-
tions four dimensions and several related properties that are commonly 
used to define university autonomy: 
1 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1972).
2 Enora Benetot Pruvot and Thomas Estermann, “University Autonomy in Europe III: 
The Scorecard 2017,” 2017, http://www.eua.be/Libraries/publications/University-Au-
tonomy-in-Europe-2017.
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The European University Association’s 4 dimensions  
of university autonomy in Europe
Organizational 
Autonomy
A university’s ability to decide freely on its internal 
organization and executive head.
Financial 
Autonomy
A university’s ability to decide freely on its internal 
financial affairs.
Staffing 
Autonomy
A university’s ability to decide freely on issues 
related to human resources management, including 
recruitments, salaries, dismissals and promotions.
Academic 
Autonomy
A university’s ability to decide on various academic 
issues, such as student admissions, academic 
content, quality assurance, the introduction of 
degree programs and the language of instruction.
Figure 13
If we look at the development in Hungary’s ranking in the survey, we can 
see that it has declined on most principles. In terms of organizational 
autonomy, it has fallen from number 16 in 2011 to 23 in 2017. In terms of 
financial autonomy, it has dropped from 6 all the way to 23 and in staffing 
autonomy from 17 to 22. Hungary has only improved in terms academic 
autonomy, from 24 to 16. It is important to note though that as for this 
last property, the option to select quality assurance boards counts for 
26% of the overall score. Thus, Hungary has boosted its standing by the 
single act of allowing Hungarian universities this freedom of choice.
3 Ibid.
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Figure 2. Source: European University Association
The merging and splitting up of institutions are done by decree, usual-
ly without consulting them. Two recent examples: Faculties from other 
universities have been moved into the new University of Public Adminis-
tration and another institution favored by the government, the University 
of Physical Education, was split off from Semmelweis University. Rectors’ 
elections were overruled in 2013 at two universities, where the top se-
lected candidates were not nominated by the Ministry, which had never 
happened before. There was an uproar, even in the Hungarian Rectors’ 
Conference, so the government retraced its steps, but as a countermea-
sure it has subsequently imposed chancellors as heads of university 
finances and administration. a chancellor is selected by the Ministry and 
appointed by the Prime Minister without the Senate or the Rector having 
a say in it. Chancellors are not only hired and employed by the Minister 
but they are regularly invited to conferences in the Ministry, where they 
get their instructions. They have full power in hiring non-academics and 
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in any financial decision. All in all, they are a foreign body to a university. 
There used to be finance managers at universities, who could object on 
rational or legal grounds to the Rector’s or the Senate’s decisions on fi-
nancial matters, which was not problematic because the finance manager 
was integral to the university and not subservient to a ministry.
Budget-wise, there has been a long process of change since 1993, when 
the first law on higher education was enacted by the first freely elected, 
and truly conservative, government in Hungary. The liberal legislation that 
they introduced and which provided for clear budgetary norms doesn’t 
exist anymore. Government-funded students are allocated to various 
degree programs and various universities again by decree. The rest of 
the budgets are decided on a case-by-case basis by the Ministry, with the 
privileged institutions getting extra subsidies. EU funding, amounting to 
several billion forints’ worth, is allocated to various universities without 
applying any general principles. 
Independence of the Hungarian Accreditation Committee has also 
been a serious issue. In 1993, half of the members were selected by the 
Academy of Sciences, and half of them by universities and various other 
organizations. Now, half of the members are appointed by the Minister 
and the other half by various other organizations, including the Rectors’ 
Conference or various bodies favored by the government, such as the new 
Arts Academy or the Chamber of Commerce.4 In the 1993 law of higher ed-
ucation it was enacted that funding for the Accreditation Committee was 
decided by Parliament, which is no longer the case. Moreover, the Minister 
must now give prior consent to any new degree program submitted to the 
Accreditation Committee. The Ministry can thus preempt, but also effec-
4 See: “1993 Hungarian Higher Education Act (1993. évi LXXX. Törvény a Felsőoktatás-
ról)” (1993), https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/?page=show&docid=99300080.TV. 
and  “2011 Hungarian National Act on Higher Education (2011. évi CCIV. Törvény 
a Nemzeti Felsőoktatásról)” (2011), http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?do-
cid=A1100204.TV&celpara=#xcelparam.
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tively overrule the Committee’s decision. Furthermore, degree programs 
can be abruptly terminated by the Ministry, and certain degree programs 
are only assigned to selected universities. For example, public adminis-
tration can only be taught at the University of Public Administration. 
What lessons can be learnt from all this? Lamentably, there has been 
little resistance by academics or by rectors. To illustrate how far we have 
progressed downhill, the Secretary for Education has recently sent a let-
ter to one of our universities declaring that the maximum salaries of pro-
fessors, whether or not they have their extra bonuses from EU projects, 
cannot exceed that of a section head in the Ministry. Or one can mention 
the Rectors’ Conference’s inept objection over Lex CEU, complaining only 
for their universities possibly not receiving sufficient numbers of foreign 
students in consequence. On the other hand, there have been mass 
demonstrations in support of CEU, rallying students and academics in 
and outside Hungary. Therefore, I think that there is still hope that we will 
be able to stand up against the repression of university autonomy and 
academic freedom.
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Historical Foundations of Academic Freedom in 
Hungary — Katalin Tausz
I would like to raise a fundamental question: 
What is the purpose of a university? 
Take my own university, Eötvös Loránd 
(ELTE). It was founded in 1635 in the small 
rural town of Nagyszombat, today Trnava 
in Slovakia, by Cardinal Péter Pázmány as 
a Catholic university for teaching theology 
and philosophy. According to the founding 
deed of the university, “It was of utmost 
importance for the university to temper 
the nature of a pugnacious nation, and 
to educate people capable to govern the 
church and to serve the state.” Let me 
emphasize this: to serve the state.
The founding of the university 
of Nagyszombat, Péter Pázmány 
in the middle (source: https://
ppke.hu/)
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There is another leading figure in the 
history of education in Hungary, József 
Eötvös. He happens to be the father of 
Loránd Eötvös, who wrote in his famous 
work Influence of the Ruling Ideas of the 
19th century on the State that literacy or 
education is a precondition of liberty and 
freedom. József Eötvös wrote that the uni-
versity should be based on the equality of 
faculties, freedom of research of the pro-
fessors and the liberty to present scientific 
results and conviction. To Eötvös, knowl-
edge is the precondition of freedom. From 
that it follows that the objective of the 
university must be to develop free individ-
uals for a free society. The precondition 
for this is good education. Though Eötvös 
described his vision for the university in 
detail, it was never fully realized.
After the revolution in the 19th century it 
was not József Eötvös’ ideas which were at 
the heart of the new university system in 
Hungary but, as in many other European 
countries, the ideas of Wilhelm von Hum-
boldt. According to Humboldt, science is 
the free activity of human beings. Freedom 
is the dominant principle of science and 
the university. The role of the university 
is not to provide civil servants and good 
Christian subjects for the state, but to 
Portray of József Eötvös 
by Gyula Stetka (source: 
Wikimedia Commons)
Portray of Wilhelm von 
Humboldt by Franz Krüger 
(source: Wikimedia Commons)
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teach and exercise science in the spirit of academic freedom. Humboldt 
argued that students should have the right to choose their professors. 
Thus, the council of the university and the state should not have direct 
control over education so that the university is strengthened through real 
autonomy
Let’s put these ideas together. Cardinal Péter Pázmány wanted to educate 
people to serve the state. József Eötvös said that education and literacy 
are the preconditions of freedom and a free society. Then Humboldt said 
that the purpose of the university is not to create good subjects for the 
state, but knowledgeable, critical thinking and autonomous individuals. 
These ideas were enshrined in Hungary’s previous constitution, which 
was in effect until 2010. It said: “The Republic of Hungary shall respect 
and support the freedom of scientific and artistic expression, the freedom 
to learn and to teach. Only scientists are entitled to decide on questions 
of scientific truth and to determine the scientific value of research.” In 
2010, the constitution was replaced by the new Fundamental Law of Hun-
gary. It says: “Hungary shall protect the scientific and artistic freedom of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Hungarian Academy of Arts.” 
The difference is obvious. We went from the protection of the freedom 
of scientific and artistic expression to the scientific and artistic freedom 
of the Academy of Sciences, which is financed by the government. This is 
reflected in the figures presented by István Kenesei, where Hungary has 
declined on nearly all measures of university autonomy in Europe. This 
raises a number of daunting questions on the state of academic freedom 
in today’s Hungary. Most of all, whether today’s legal and institutional 
system is in line with the fundamental ideas of Eötvös and Humboldt or 
those of Pázmány. 
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— Valéria Csépe is President of 
the Hungarian Higher Education 
Accreditation Committee (HAC)
Academic Freedom and Quality Assurance  
in Hungarian Universities — Valéria Csépe
In September 2016, I became president of the Hungarian Higher Educa-
tion Accreditation Committee (HAC). Since then, different decisions were 
made to change the working style of HAC and to abandon its previous 
role; HAC has often been seen as the policeman of higher education insti-
tutions in Hungary. In the past years, HAC has been operating as a critical 
partner with its stakeholders when changes or reforms were introduced, 
including legislative changes in higher education. This had a considerable 
impact on the question of how the autonomy of higher education institu-
tions should be changed in terms of increasing the universities’ responsi-
bility towards quality assurance. 
When we take the point of view of an accreditation committee, data by 
the European University Association indicates that Hungary belongs to 
the countries where universities can choose a quality assurance agency 
freely and according to their needs. This includes agencies from other 
EU countries. From this point of view, Hungary has a relatively high score 
and seems to be doing well. The Primary Law states: “Higher education 
institutions shall be autonomous in terms of content and the methods 
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of research and teaching, their organization shall be regulated by an act. 
The government shall, within the framework of an act, lay down the rules 
governing the financial management of public higher education insti-
tutions and shall supervise their financial management.” In themselves, 
these are robust constitutional provisions. However, the question is how 
all these work in practice. If we look at the University Autonomy Scorecard 
published by the European University Association, we see that Hungary 
ranks very low on nearly all indicators. Its poor performance is rooted in 
a restrictive legislative process which is based on a paternalistic view of 
higher education that has historic roots in Hungary. For a long time, there 
has been the assumption that policymakers and politicians know better 
than academics how to run a university. This attitude is in contradiction 
with the integrity and autonomy of higher education institutions and in 
general with academic freedom.
Further questions arise when higher education quality assurance criteria 
are considered. What are the students’ interests at our universities and 
how well do we evaluate the outcomes of higher education? From this 
point of view, there are further sources of violation. Here we may see how 
some stakeholders such as professors in different positions and com-
mittees violate the academic freedom of others; when judging on new 
courses, new programs, new doctoral schools. Often this is rooted only in 
counterproductive competition; in Hungary we have learned to compete 
but not to cooperate. This is very important as there is a considerable 
imbalance between competition and cooperation. On the other hand, 
professional judgement of academics may be influenced by political 
bias as well. This is very difficult to trace and to correct. Still, it is highly 
important to prevent this, particularly via inviting foreign experts to the 
accreditation process. 
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There are also different kinds of unconscious bias. Therefore, we must 
prevent any negative effect, be it as a result of intolerance or orthodoxy. 
People in high-ranking positions may be intolerant towards new pro-
grams or to free inquiry. Decades ago in my own profession I experienced 
how intolerant mainstream psychology can be towards new areas such as 
cognitive science and neuroscience. Now research and higher education 
in these fields are internationally recognized. Two of my former col-
leagues working at CEU are among the most cited researchers of theoret-
ical and cognitive neuroscience. Their contribution to the performance 
of Hungarian higher education is significant as they produce outstanding 
results; quality and excellence is what counts.
A further problem that is important to mention, to know and prevent 
from a quality assurance point of view is the small country effect, seen in 
all types of evaluation. In the US, the job market has a fantastic regula-
tory role that steers the universities’ responsibility for quality assurance. 
There, you know what a PhD as a degree means when it comes from 
Harvard or MIT as compared to a less recognized university. That, we do 
not have here yet and it is one of the many barriers we face and need to 
change if we want to have progress in academic quality and at the end in 
academic freedom. We have to do a lot to improve our practices. We have 
a long way to go.
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University
The Situation in Hungary from the Perspective of 
Private Universities — László Vass
Hungary is very bureaucratic in some ways. Governments love to regulate, 
no matter if it is necessary or not. This is centuries’ long history, it is not 
new, but for private universities it can be uncomfortable. We have to com-
ply with most higher education regulations with one small exception, the 
employment of teachers. In the public sector, teachers are public employ-
ees. We, private universities, on the other hand operate under the general 
labor code, which governs the private and business sector. Our teachers 
generally do not have such stable and protected positions as the ones in 
public universities. Yet it gives us more flexibility in many respects. 
The big question we are asking here is what is the role of academic free-
dom and autonomy in the 21st century, particularly, what is the mission 
of a private higher education institution? I love that vision of Humboldt 
and the 19th century unified utopia about the elite academic cast having 
high social respect and special privileges in society. But is this vision still 
appropriate today? We, the private universities and colleges in Hungary, 
feel that the capitalist market economy has destroyed such protected en-
claves in our society. Why should professors enjoy a protected position? 
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Because they have the knowledge, others do not. The biggest tensions are 
between politicians and professors. a politician was born to know every-
thing, the professors learned everything. That is a problem. 
If we want to understand our current problems, we need to examine 
closer also the history of public administration in Hungary, which has 
been centralized and step-by-step politicized over the past 27 years. Every 
successive government moved a step closer towards a spoils system of 
public administration. This has been happening in the field of higher 
education too. Yet I do not see much direct pressure or intervention from 
the government against academic freedom. The reality is more subtle. 
There are various traditional patterns of obedience, often political expec-
tations are assumed rather than directly communicated or enforced. 
Over hundreds of years in history, Hungarians learned to cope. On one 
hand you obey, on the other hand you cheat the government. Because 
relations and regulations are often not very transparent and complete, 
people know very well how to behave. The government wants to do this, 
we do that. This tradition is obviously not acceptable. We need clear 
normative regulations which are transparent and under which we can 
operate well. We obviously need more autonomy, but also more efficient 
and effective regulation. When we started our private university, we real-
ized within two years that we can do everything at 20 percent lower costs 
than a state university, because we operate much more efficiently. We got 
a chancellor as demanded by our owners, whom we call our executive 
director. This position is highly ranked, it helped us to ensure our opera-
tions in the most economical way, and to use our resources much better. 
In a very fragmented higher education system, the government always 
has a headache about finance. We see in the figures that István Kenesei 
presents how unstable the level of higher education finance has been. 
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Unfortunately, we are a four-year country. We have parliamentary elec-
tions every four years. Everything starts again after the election of a new 
government, but higher education policy should be much longer-term. It 
does not work on a four-year policy cycle. Eight years of stability may be 
regarded as the minimum, but we have not had more than four years of 
stability at a time over the past 25 years, this is a big problem.
Finally, I want to raise what I believe are the key questions ahead: What 
is the vision of higher education in the 21st century? What is the mission 
of universities? What is the position of highly-educated researchers and 
professors in society? What does autonomy mean in a globalized and 
networked world? We are all financially, scientifically and social net-
worked and we depend on those networks.
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Freedom and Its Enemies, or How To Be a Good 
Citizen in a Tangled World — Mario Vargas Llosa
Freedom is a valuable good, but no country and no human 
being can ever be sure of it, if he is not able to own it, to 
exercise it and to defend it. Literature, which breathes be-
cause of it and suffocates without it, can make you compre-
hend that freedom is not a gift of the heavens but a choice, 
a conviction, a practice and a set of beliefs that need to 
be constantly enriched and tested. (Excerpt from Vargas 
Llosa’s acceptance speech of the Peace Prize of the German 
Book Trade, 1996 [translated])1 
When the students at CEU finish their studies, they must be prepared to 
enter a world which is difficult, with plenty of opportunities but also with 
many uncertainties; a world transformed by the extraordinary technical 
revolutions of the last years, but also a world in which jobs that were 
taken for granted for everybody are becoming more and more a privilege, 
a world in which, when you want to have a job, you have to invent it and 
create it yourself. I am sure that graduates of CEU are well trained to face 
1 Mario Vargas Llosa, “Dank: Dinosaurier in Schweren Zeiten,” 1996, http://www.frie-
denspreis-des-deutschen-buchhandels.de/sixcms/media.php/1290/1996_Llosa.pdf.
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the challenges of this new world. CEU prepares students to be good pro-
fessionals but also to be good citizens which I think is one of the obliga-
tions of any serious academic institution in the world in which we live. 
What does it mean to be a good citizen? It does not only mean to be 
a law-abiding citizen, cultivated and alert, with a culture that does not 
allow oneself to be manipulated by the powers of this world. I think the 
essential feature of a good citizen is that he or she has a critical spirit. 
Such citizens do not permit themselves to be convinced by the powers 
that be that they are living in the best of worlds. No society is the best 
of all worlds. There is always something lacking and it is indispensable 
to believe there could be better opportunities and a better life. This is 
something that only democracy permits. 
We are very lucky that the worst enemies of democratic culture and of 
democratic society—racism, fascism, and communism—have been defeat-
ed in our times. The Soviet Union has collapsed because of its inability 
to satisfy the most elementary ambitions of its population. China has 
become a capitalist country. It is still a dictatorship, but a capitalist dicta-
torship. I don’t think there are many rational, sensible people who would 
think that countries like Cuba or Venezuela are a model, if you want to 
have a free, well-adjusted country. Democracy now has the world to itself 
and is making progress. When I was young in Latin America we had dicta-
torships from one extreme to the other with only three exceptions: Chile, 
Costa Rica and Uruguay. Now what we have, with the exception of Cuba 
and Venezuela, are democracies which are imperfect even highly corrupt, 
but a bad democracy is much better than a good dictatorship. 
All our efforts will be directed toward turning Peru from the 
country of proletarians, the unemployed, and the privi-
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leged elites that it is today into a country of entrepreneurs, 
property owners, and citizens equal before the law. (Mario 
Vargas Llosa, A Fish in the Water)2
The enemies of democracy are now within democracies themselves: 
populism and nationalism. They are not the same thing. Populism is 
more than nationalism, but an essential aspect of populism is national-
ism. Both are reactions to globalization. Globalization is a reality, but not 
everybody is happy. Many people are afraid about the opening of borders. 
They are terrified and they are succumbing to what Karl Popper called the 
temptation of the tribe: to regress to a primitive state where everybody 
knows everybody, where you can be assured because everyone speaks 
your language, shares your beliefs and customs. 
Totalitarianism is not simply amoral. It is the morality of 
the closed society—of the group, or of the tribe; it is not 
individual selfishness, but it is collective selfishness. (Karl 
Popper)3
This kind of tribal temptation is still present in many countries. I think 
this is what is behind the conspiracy to close the Central European 
University. The government does not like what this institution is doing: 
training students to be good professionals, but also to be good citizens, 
democratic citizens with an alert and critical spirit. They thought it would 
be easy to close this institution, a discrete operation. They made a law 
to justify their act but were extremely surprised because it turned out to 
be not as discrete and secret as they would have liked it to be. Because 
there was a reaction, a strong reaction, not only in Hungary, not only in 
Europe but also in the US and in other countries all over the world. 
2 Mario Vargas Llosa, A Fish in the Water: A Memoir (New York: Picador, 1993), 181.
3 Karl Popper, Open Society and Its Enemies (London: Routledge, 2011), 108.
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What has happened is extremely important. Thousands of people all over 
the world have understood that what is happening here is a battle for the 
future of Europe, for the Europe we are constructing now. 
In a world of permanent change we cannot, according to 
[Karl] Popper, ‘return to the alleged innocence and beau-
ty of the closed society’, without sparking the destructive 
force, which has already been forgotten in Europe. In Latin 
America you can see where this leads to. (Mario Vargas 
 Llosa in an interview with the Neue Züricher Zeitung in 
2016)4
The Europe that we are building is probably the most ambitious project 
of a culture of freedom in history. It is a reality and has produced almost 
seventy years of peace on a continent which has been destroying itself 
for a long time. We now have a construction that represents something 
extremely ambitious, not only for Europe but also for the rest of the world. 
True, many things can be criticized about the construction of Europe. 
There is too much bureaucratization. Brussels does not reach the base of 
society. One of the problems with the construction of Europe is that only 
political and cultural elites are aware of its global importance. Many Eu-
ropeans have not embraced the enthusiasm that is necessary for the idea 
of Europe. But they receive the benefits. When I went to Spain for the first 
time as a young student it was an underdeveloped country with a brutal 
dictatorship, totally isolated from the rest of the world. In Lima, in the 
diversity of San Marco University, we knew more about what was going 
on in France and in Italy than in Madrid. Look at Spain now! It has moved 
from dictatorship to democracy, from an underdeveloped to a developed 
4 Michael Wiederstein, “Literatur Ist Rebellion,” Neue Züricher Zeitung, July 7, 2016, 
https://www.nzz.ch/feuilleton/mario-vargas-llosa-im-gespraech-literatur-ist-rebel-
lion-ld.104313.
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country. The middle class has grown enormously and it is a democrat-
ic country. This would not have been possible without Europe. If you 
examine the countries of Europe you will see how the EU has helped 
each to profit. When you balance out what has been achieved against the 
problems that exist in Europe, the present seems enormously favorable. 
Therefore, I am quite optimistic for the future. But we need to further try 
to reach the base of society in Europe through different means. 
The defense of CEU is a defense of what Europe wants to be, the creation 
of a culture of freedom. It is this culture that has produced the most 
important social, cultural and political achievements in the history of 
mankind. Within Europe we have enemies of democracy, people who are 
terrified by the opening of borders, by coexistence in diversity, in cultural, 
social and political terms. They want to regress in history to the old times, 
the times of closed nationalities, the times of the tribes. 
I belief that many prejudices that were raised against globalization are 
unfounded. The idea that globalization is going to standardize the world 
and that not only languages but also customs and beliefs are going to be 
made uniform is completely absurd. French culture will not disappear with 
globalization, neither will English or Spanish culture. To the contrary, in this 
open space, cultures will have the possibility not only to develop but to 
enrich themselves through this coexistence. Globalization erodes borders 
which after religions have been the major source of wars, brutality and 
violence in the history of humankind. It is not destroying the nation. It is 
pacifying what is potentially violent in the idea of the nation. Nations are 
not disappearing but they are changing dramatically. Europe was full of 
hate until very recently. The best demonstration of this are the two world 
wars in which millions of Europeans disappeared. If there is a continent in 
which globalization should be received with open arms, it is Europe. 
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You may tell me now that contrary to my ideas one must always be a citi-
zen of a given country, you can’t be a citizen of everywhere. Then I would 
reply: But why not? You can be a citizen of Europe. Many Europeans have 
different nationalities because of the arbitrariness of history. I still be-
lieve in the attachment to a country which is for example an attachment 
to a language. You feel that your language is something essential to you. 
My attachment to Spanish makes me attached to Peru, to Colombia and 
at least twenty-three countries in the world. Customs were much more 
uniform in the past. Now you have the possibility to be different, a kind 
of opportunity that we did not have before. If you were French you were 
French, and if not, you were a traitor. Now you can choose. If you feel 
better in a certain country than yours, you have not only the opportunity 
but also the right to become Hungarian, Russian or even Chinese. These 
are freedoms that we did not have in the past and I think we should 
celebrate them. 
I do not think that this conspiracy against academic freedom, against 
the culture of freedom and against democracy is going to prevail. The 
reaction has been enormous. Academics, writers, teachers and politicians 
have been mobilized, feeling that if this conspiracy succeeds in Hunga-
ry, the European project is under threat. It may happen again in other 
countries and the minority which is still resisting this opening of the 
borders and this integration in diversity that Europe represents will also 
be threatened. Freedom is not divisible, you cannot fragment it and use 
only one aspect of freedom and reject the others. If you have economic 
freedom but no political freedom, economic freedom does not work. If 
you have political freedom but no economic freedom, it does not work 
either. Freedom is indivisible, you have to accept it with all the risks that 
without a doubt come with it. Freedom brings enormous challenges, but 
when you accept it, you know that you will not only have risks but also 
extraordinary achievements: peace, the security to live in a legal structure 
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which protects you against the arbitrariness of the powers of this world 
and also diversity of beliefs, of convictions, of ideas that permits a dem-
ocratic society to learn from its mistakes. Democracy is indeed the only 
system that learns from its mistakes. 
Books and writers can play an enormous role in upholding a culture 
of freedom. All dictatorships in history, all authoritarian regimes that 
wanted to control life from beginning to end have been suspicious of 
literature and created systems of censorship and control. We are only 
surprised in democracy that books can be dangerous. But dictators know 
better than us. In a dictatorship books always threaten power. Why? 
Because books become a way through which people become informed of 
what TV, radio and newspapers don’t cover. When Hungary was a satellite 
of the Soviet Union, Hungarians read books to figure out what was going 
on. They immediately went to literature to have the kind of information 
that reality did not provide. This is dangerous, because after you read 
a good novel and when you return to the real world, what you discover 
is that the worlds that we writers invent are much better than the real 
world. You discover in yourself a malaise when facing the real world and 
you become unsatisfied. Dissatisfaction is very dangerous for regimes 
that want to demonstrate that reality is perfect. That is the reason why 
dictatorships are very suspicious of literature. Literature is very important 
to awaken the critical spirit which is essential in democratic society.
There are so many writers in Europe who are trying to save CEU from this 
conspiracy against freedom. They are also trying to save the culture of 
freedom and the future Europe we want. If we win I think there are great 
chances that we will also win the war against populism, nationalism and 
all the enemies of the culture of freedom. But what if we fail? Believe me, 
we will not fail. We have no reason to be pessimistic.
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